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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Preamble 
To date, the vast majority of the empirical tests concerning 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) have concerned the U.S., European, and 
Japanese economies. However, there is no reason to confine the study of 
PPP to nations with similar industrial structures or monetary policies. 
As shown by Mussa (1979) and Enders (1989), PPP works well for nations 
experiencing very different inflation rates. 
One aim of this dissertation is to analyze the causes of the 
departures from PPP. Most modern models of exchange rate determination 
suggest that real shocks can induce changes in the real exchange rate; a 
real shock which is permanent can induce a permanent deviation from PPP. 
Monetary shocks, on the other hand, can induce temporary but not permanent 
deviations from PPP. Even in models in which money is not neutral in the 
short-run, long-run money neutrality guarantees that money shocks of any 
variety have no permanent effects on the long-run value of the real 
exchange rate. 
In this light, it is interesting to consider the PPP relationship for 
the Pacific Rim nations. These nations—particularly Korea and Japan-
represent rapidly growing economies with strong trading ties to other 
Pacific Rim nations as well as to the United States and Europe. A 
comparison of the performance of PPP between Japan and Korea (both rapidly 
growing nations) might provide an interesting contrast to that of Korea 
versus other Pacific Rim nations and to Korea versus the U.S. 
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To preview our results, we use the methodology of Enders (1988, 1989) 
and Corbae and Ouliaris (1989) and show that PPP works poorly for the 
nations in our data set. 
Using Korea as the référant nation, real exchange rate appear to be 
non-stationary and domestic prices are not cointegrated with foreign price 
levels and the exchange rate. Using a vector-autoregression, we show that 
real shocks (as measured by industrial production shocks and interest 
rates) do not induce deviations from PPP. For the case of the U.S./Korean 
real exchange rate, monetary shocks are associated with changes in th real 
exchange rates. Perhaps our most important result is that these money 
shocks cause temporary, but not permanent, changes in the real exchange 
rate; long-run money neutrality cannot be rejected. 
Organization of Study 
The organization of the study of PPP is as follows. In Chapter II, 
we will describe the Korean economy briefly. In Chapter III, we will do 
the literature review about PPP. This literature review will include the 
theoretical and empirical performance of PPP. In Chapter IV, we will do 
the unit root and cointegration test of PPP by employing the methodology 
of Enders (1988, 1989) and Corbae and Ouliaris (1989). In Chapter V, we 
will find the sources of PPP disparity by using a vector autoregression 
(VAR) analysis. Lastly, we will discuss the conclusions of this study. 
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CHAPTER II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
To understand Korea's modern economic growth and development, a 
brief examination of the historical record is essential. 
In 1945, at the end of World War II, Korea was liberated from a 
35-year period of Japanese colonial rule. The liberation from Japan 
brought about the unexpected partition of the country into South and 
North Korea, and South Korea was cut off from the resources and 
industrial base of the North. The Korean War (1950-1953) devastated the 
infrastructure of the South Korean economy. As a result. South Korea had 
to rely for its subsistence on an agrarian economy after the Korean War. 
In 1953, for example, the agricultural sector was the main industry in 
Korea, which accounted for four-fifths of Korea's GNP. 
Post-war reconstruction and development was facilitated by the 
industriousness of its people, their high level of education, and foreign 
assistance, particularly from the U.S. By the early 1960s, Korea had 
almost completed easy import substitution in nondurable consumer goods 
and their inputs. The next stage after easy import substitution would be 
that import substitution in durable consumer goods and machinery should 
occur. Instead, South Korea had adopted the export-led industrialization 
strategy, which resulted in a remarkable rate of economic growth. The 
reason to adopt the outward-looking industrialization strategy in Korea, 
rather than to continue import substitution, was that the domestic market 
was so small and there were few natural resources. 
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 1, we 
will discuss economic growth, industrial structure change, and the change 
in private consumption patterns. In Section 2, we will examine 
employment patterns and the quality of human resources in Korea. In 
Section 3, we will review domestic capital formation. Lastly, open 
macroeconomic issues in Korea will be discussed. 
Economic Growth and Industrial Structure Change^ 
Since the 1960s, the Korean economy has showed rapid economic growth 
in spite of the world recession (1974-1975) following the first world oil 
shock and the political instability following President Park's 
assassination in 1980. 
Table 2-1 presents the major indicators of Korean economic growth 
during the period from 1954 to 1987. In contrast to the average growth 
rate of 3.6 percent of real GNP in Korea for the period from 1954 to 
1962, the Korean economy has recorded an average annual rate of 8.4 
percent during the period from 1962 to 1982. The real GNP growth rate in 
the period from 1962 to 1972 was 9.1 percent per year, a slightly higher 
rate than that for the following decade. This rapid growth of GNP has 
brought very fast growth of per capita income, which was partly due to 
the gradual decline in the population growth rate from about 2.5 percent 
in the 1960s to 1.6 percent in the 1970s. Korea's per capita real GNP 
(in 1975 constant dollar), which had grown at an average annual rate of 
^This part heavily draws on Kim and Park (1985). 
Table 2-1. Major indicators of Korean economic growth, 1954-1987® 
Annual Avg. 
% 
Growth Rate 
1954 1962 1972 1982 1987 54-62 62-72 72-82 62-82 
1. Population 
(in million persons) 
21.8 26.5 33.5 39.3 42.0 2.5 2.4 1.6 2.0 
2. Gross national product 
(in 1975 constant billion won) 
2,319 3,071 7(366 15,509 66,319^ 3.6 9,1 7.7 8.4 
Primary industry 
(share of GNP, %) 
1,186 
51.1) 
1,391 
(45.3) 
2,150 
(29.2) 
2,976 
(19.2) 
8,584^ 
(12.5) 
2.0 4.5 3.3 3.9 
Manufacturing 
(Share of GNP, %) 
123 
(5.3) 
279 
(9.1) 
1,538 
(20.9) 
5,304 
(34.2) 
31,073^ 
(45.1) 
10.8 18.6 13.2 15.9 
Social overhead & services 
(Share of GNP, %) 
1,010 
42.6) 
1,401 
(45.6) 
3,677 
(49.9) 
7,229 
(46.6) 
29,161^ 
(42.4) 
4.2 10.1 7.0 8.6 
Per capita GNP 
(in 1975 constant won) 
106,376 115,887 219,881 394,631 N.A. 1.1 6.6 6.0 6.3 
Per capita GNP 
(in 1975 constant dollar) 
220 239 454 815 N.A. 1.1 6.6 6.0 6.3 
Per capita private consumption 84,755 100,114 166,388 260,359 N.A. 
3. Exports and imports^ 
Commodity exports, 
f.o.b. ($ million) 
24 55 1,624 21,853 47,280 10.9 40.3 29.7 34.9 
Conmiodity imports, 
c.i.f. ($ million) 
243 422 2,522 24,251 41,019 7.1 19.6 25.4 22.5 
Share of manufactured® 
exports in total # (%) 
N.A. 27.0 87.7 93.7 N.A. 
Ratio of commodity exports 
to GNP # {%) 0.8 2.0 16.4 31.8 N.A. 
Ratio of commodity imports 
to GNP # (%) 7.2 15.6 23.7 36.5 N.A. : 
4. Investment and savings^ 
Share of gross domestic 
investment in GNP # (%) 11.9 12.8 21.7 26.2 29.7 
Share of manufacturing 
investment in total fixed 
investment # (%) 
17.5 20.6 19.4 15.3 N.A. 
Domestic saving rate # (%) 6.6 3.3 15.7 21.5 36.6 
Foreign saving rate # (%) 5.3 10.7 5.2 4.8 -6.9 
®The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1982, 1988. 
^Based on 1980 constant prices. GNP in 1982, based on 1980 constant prices is 41,211. 
^The share of GDP is calculated based on 1980 constant prices. 
^Based on current price data. 
®The Republic of Korea (1982). 
7 
1.1 percent for the period from 1954 to 1962, increased at an annual rate 
of about 6 percent thereafter. Note that per capita GNP in 1982 was 
U.S.$815, which is about three times greater than that in 1962. 
Nobody doubts that the export-oriented industrialization strategy 
was the major source for the remarkable economic development in Korea 
since the 1960s. To support the outward-looking (export-oriented) 
industrialization strategy, a package of policy reforms was designed, in 
addition to the exchange rate reform of 1964. Exports expanded rapidly 
in response to these policies. Between 1962 and 1972, exports grew by an 
average annual rate of 40.3 percent; merchandise exports amounted to $55 
million in 1962, but increased to $1,624 million in 1972. This export 
growth trend continued during the period from 1972 to 1982. The average 
annual rate of export growth during this period was 29.7 percent. 
Export-led growth strategy strengthened the variety of export 
products; eventually, it changed the industrial structure. Note that in 
the early 1960s, the major part of export commodities are raw materials 
(Tungsten, iron ore, rice, etc.), whereas, manufactured exports are only 
a small portion of the total. Strikingly, the share of manufactured 
exports in total increased from 27 percent (in 1962) to 93.7 percent (in 
1982). Furthermore, this manufacturing sector leads the growth of the 
overall economy; the manufacturing sector grew by 16 percent per year 
from 1962 to 1982, compared to 11 percent per year during the 1950s. The 
growth in the manufacturing sector had caused the industrial structure to 
change. The portion of the primary sector in GNP has shrunk from about 
8 
45 percent in 1962 to 19 percent in 1982. On the other hand, the share 
of the social overhead and other service sectors remained almost 
unchanged at about 47 percent between 1962 and 1982. This rapid economic 
growth and industrial structure change in Korea required a sustained 
increase in domestic capital accumulation. Domestic capital formation 
will be discussed in Section 3. 
The rapid increase in per capita GNP gave rise to a substantial 
increase in the absolute amount of per capita private consumption 
expenditures between 1962 and 1982. Per capita private consumption 
expenditures in 1975 constant prices increased from 100,114 won in 1962 
to 260,359 won by 1982. Along with the increase in per capita 
consumption, the significant change in consumption patterns occurred 
during two decades. Table 2-2 summarizes the trends in consumption 
patterns of individual households. The proportion of food expenses in 
private consumption expenditures declined from 51 percent in 1962 to 41 
percent in 1982. In contrast, the share of personal and health expenses 
in private consumption expenditures increased from 4.1 percent in 1962 to 
8.6 percent in 1982. This structural change in consumption patterns may 
indicate that the welfare of the Korean economy has increased since the 
1960s. Table 2.3 confirms that consumer welfare continuously increased 
during the period from 1982 to 1987. It is striking that consumption for 
durable goods in 1987 was more than two times that of 1982. On the other 
hand, the consumption for nondurable goods increased very slowly compared 
to durable goods. 
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Table 2-2. Trends in composition of private consumption expenditures 
(based on the current price series)® 
(in percent) 
1954 1962 1972 1982 
Food 51.7 51.2 47.8 41.0 
Beverage 4.5 4.6 4.9 6.0 
Tobacco 2.9 3.1 3.9 4.1 
Clothing and other personal effects 11.8 11.5 10.1 7.9 
Rent and water charges 15.8 7.2 4.9 5.0 
Furniture and household equipment 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.9 
Household operation 1.7 1.2 1.1 0.8 
Personal care and health expenses 2.6 4.1 5.6 8.6 
Transportation and communication 2.0 4.7 7.1 9.2 
Recreation and entertainment 4.2 3.8 5.5 5.0 
Miscellaneous services 2.7 2.1 3.3 5.5 
Less net expenditures of nonresidents 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
®The Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea, 1982. 
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Table 2-3. Composition of final consumption of households by type^ 
(in billion won) 
At 1980 Constant Prices 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Durable goods 972. 0 1,227.8 1,468.0 1,476. 2 1,841. 1 2,350.6 
Semi-durable 
goods 
3,213. 2 3,435.5 3,568.1 3,675. 0 3,937. 7 4,296.0 
Nondurable 
goods 
14,795. 1 15,689.6 16,284.2 16,982. 2 18,264. 2 19,386.9 
Services 7,641. 8 8,303.8 9,031.3 9,746. 1 10,294. 0 11,000.6 
Final consump­
tion expendi­
ture in the 
domestic market 
26,622. 1 28,656.7 30,351.6 31,879. 5 34,337. 0 37,034.1 
Dir. purchases 
abroad by 
res. hshlds. 
199. 0 156.5 174.5 192. 7 117. 3 133.9 
(less) Purch. 
in domestic 
market by non­
resident hshds. 
245. 4 273.4 312.5 395. 9 769. 7 1,106.9 
Final consump­
tion expend. 
26,575. 7 28,539.8 30,213.6 31,676. 3 33,684. 6 36,061.1 
®The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1988. 
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Employment 
Korean economic development since the 1960s has been stimulated by 
the ready availability of workers, the high mobility of workers from 
rural to urban areas, and the high level manpower resources. Despite 
massive unemployment and underemployment already present in both the 
rural and urban sectors of the economy, Korea's population increased very 
rapidly until the early 1960s. Tables 2-4 and 2-5 make it clear that the 
average annual growth rate of the population of age 14 and over was 3 
percent during the period from 1963 to 1982, while the average annual 
growth rate of the total population for the same period was about 2 
percent. This is suggestive of the fact that those children born during 
the post-Korean baby boom were joining the working-age population after 
the early 1970s. The labor force participation rate of the female 
population increased strikingly, which implied that the economically 
active population increased more than the working-age population during 
the period from 1963 to 1982. 
Korea's export-led industrialization strategy provides employment 
opportunities not only for the persons already unemployed but also for 
those newly joing the labor force. Note that the increase in nonfarm 
sector employment induced by the export-led growth strategy caused the 
industrial structure to change. The portion of nonfarm employment out 
of total national employment in 1963 was about 36 percent, whereas, it 
increased to over 50 percent in 1974. It is striking that the absolute 
level of farm employment has declined since 1974, as shown in Table 2-5. 
Table 2-4. Population, labor force, employment and unemployment rate, 1963-1987& 
(in millions of persons, unless otherwise noted) 
Total Population Labor Force Employed Population Unemployment Rate (%) 
Year Population 14 & older Total Farm Nonfarm Total Farm Nonfarm Total Farm Nonfarm 
1963 27.26 15.09 8.34 5.09 3.25 7.66 4.94 2.72 8.2 2.9 16.4 
1964 27.98 15.50 8.45 5.17 3.28 7.80 4.99 2.81 7.7 3.5 14.4 
1965 28.71 15.94 8.86 5.23 3.63 8.21 5.07 3.14 7.4 3.1 13.5 
1966 29.44 16.37 9.07 5.28 3.79 8.42 5.12 3.30 7.1 3.1 12.8 
1967 30.13 16.76 9.30 5.20 4.10 8.72 5.07 3.65 6.2 2.3 11.1 
1968 30.84 17.17 9.65 5.26 4.39 9.16 5.16 4.00 5.1 1.9 8.9 
1969 31.54 17.64 9.89 5.26 4.63 9.41 5.15 4.26 4.8 2.2 7.8 
1970 32.24 18.25 10.20 5.20 5.00 9.75 5.12 4.63 4.5 1.6 7.4 
1971 32.88 18.98 10.54 5.09 5.45 10.07 5.02 5.05 4.5 1.5 7.4 
1972 33.51 19.72 11.06 5.41 5.65 10.56 5.34 5.22 4.5 1.5 7.5 
1973 34.10 20.44 11.60 5.68 5.92 11.14 5.63 5.51 4.0 1.0 6.8 
1974 34.69 21.15 12.08 5.77 6.31 11.59 5.71 5.88 4.1 1.2 6.8 
1975 35.28 21.83 12.34 5.67 6.67 11.83 5.60 6.23 4.1 1.3 6.6 
1976 35.75 22.55 13.06 5.91 7.15 12.56 6.86 6.70 3.9 1.0 6.3 
1977 36.41 22.34 13.44 5.71 7.73 12.93 5.65 7.28 3.8 1.1 5.8 
1978 36.97 24.02 13.93 5.59 8.35 13.49 5.54 7.95 3.2 0.9 4.7 
1979 37.53 24.68 14.21 5.40 8.80 13.66 5.36 8.31 3.8 0.9 5.6 
1980 38.12 25.34 14.45 5.17 9.29 13.71 5.11 8.59 5.2 1.1 7.5 
1981 38.72 25.97 14.71 5.20 9.51 14.05 5.16 8.89 4.5 0.9 6.5 
1982 33.33 26.53. 15.08 4.85 10.23 14.42 4.81 9.61 4.4 0.9 6.0 
1983 39.93 26.21° 15.12 N.A. N.A. 14.50 4.3 10.2 4.1 N.A. N.A. 
1984 40.51 26.86 15.00 N.A. N.A. 14.43 3.9 10.5 3.8 N.A. N.A. 
1985 41.06 27.55 15.59 N.A. N.A. 14.97 3.7 11.2 4.0 N.A. N.A. 
1986 41.57 28.23 16.12 N.A. N.A. 15.50 3.7 11.8 3.8 N.A. N.A. 
1987 42.08 28.96 16.87 N.A. N.A. 16.35 3.6 12.8 3.1 N.A. N.A. 
^The Republic of Korea (1982, 1988). 
^All series of economically active population since 1983 were adjusted according to changing 
the working age from 14 to 15 years old. 
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Table 2-5. Annual rate of increase in population, labor force, and 
employment® 
(in percent) 
Population Labor Force Employment 
Year Total 14 yrs. & 
Population Over Total Farm Nonfarm Total Farm Nonfarm 
1963 2.8 
1964 2.7 2.7 1.3 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.0 3.3 
1965 2.6 2.8 4.9 1.2 10.7 5.3 1.6 11.7 
1966 2.6 2.7 2.4 0.1 4.4 2.6 1.0 5.1 
1967 2.4 2.4 2.5 -1.5 8.2 3.6 -1.0 10.6 
1968 2.4 2.5 3.8 1.2 7.1 5.0 1.8 9.6 
1969 2.3 2.7 2.4 0.0 5.5 2.7 -0.2 6.5 
1970 2.2 3.5 3.2 -1.1 8.0 3.6 -0.6 8.7 
1971 2.0 4.0 3.3 -2.1 9.0 3.3 -2.0 9.1 
1972 1.9 3.9 4.9 6.3 3.7 4.9 6.4 3.4 
1973 1.8 3.7 4.9 5.0 4.8 5.5 5.4 5.6 
1974 1.7 3.5 4.1 1.6 6.6 4.0 1.4 6.7 
1975 1.7 3.2 2.2 -1.7 5.7 2.1 -1.9 6.0 
1976 1.6 3.3 5.8 4.3 7.2 6.2 4.5 7.6 
1977 1.6 3.5 2.9 -3.4 8.1 2.9 -3.6 8.7 
1978 1.5 2.9 3.6 -2.1 8.0 4.3 -1.9 9.2 
1979 1.5 2.7 2.0 -3.4 5.4 1.3 -3.2 4.5 
1980 1.6 2.7 2.0 -4.3 5.6 0.4 -4.7 3.4 
1981 1.6 2.5 1.8 0.6 2.4 2.5 1.0 3.5 
1982 1.6 2.2 2.5 -6.7 7.6 2.6 -6.8 8.1 
Average annual rate Î of increase: 
63-72 2.3 3.0 3.2 0.7 6.3 3.6 0.9 7.5 
72-82 1.6 3.0 3.1 -1.1 4.5 3.2 -1.0 6.3 
^Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 
1982. Referred to in Kim and Park (1985). 
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Apparently, the rapid increase in non-farm employment was absorbed by the 
manufacturing and social overhead and other service sectors. 
The rapid economic development in Korea has not been made possible 
without quality labor. The rapidly growing economy requires a 
correspondingly rapid increase in educated manpower and its qualitative 
improvement in the future. In this context, Korea continuously increased 
investments in education to meet the various industrial demands. Table 
2-6 shows that the portion of the working age population with formal 
education increased from 57 percent of the total in 1960 to about 87 
percent by 1980. The share of the working-age population with a higher-
level education (above midle school) increased from about 20 percent of 
the total to 60 percent during the same period. The most important fact 
is that the educational level of the female population increased 
considerably during the two decades. This implied that the potential 
labor force increased. 
We can not go to the conclusion of this section without mentioning 
the following. Nobody doubts that economic development can be 
facilitated by high-quality human resources. The problems in the Korean 
educational system are that 1) high-quality educational institutions are 
distributed in favor of metropolitan areas such as Seoul and Pusan; that 
is, there are regional imbalances in opportunities and the quality of 
education, and 2) educational facilities and teachers are in short supply 
compared with foreign countries. 
Table 2.6 Composition of population aged 14 and over by sex and educational level^ 
(in thousand persons) 
Both Sexes Male Female 
1960^ 1980 1960^ 1980 1960^ 1980 
Educational^ Popula­ % Popula­ % Popula­ % Popula­ % Popula­ % Popula­ % 
Level tion Share tion Share tion Share tion Share tion Share tion Share 
Primary Sch 5,775 37.5 7,066 27.6 2,988 39.3 2,863 22.6 2,786 35.7 4,203 32.5 
Middle Sch 1,522 9.9 6,128 23.9 1,060 13.9 3,078 24.3 462 5.9 3,050 23.5 
High School 1,133 7.4 6,831 26.7 853 11.2 4,042 32.0 280 3.6 2,789 21.5 
Jr. College 175 1.1 388 1.5 149 2.0 274 2.2 26 0.3 114 0.9 
University 206 1.3 1,891 7.4 184 2.4 1,412 11.2 23 0.3 479 3.7 
College + 
Sub-Total 8,811 57.2 22,304 87.1 5,234 68.8 11,669 92.2 3,577 45.8 10,635 82.1 
Persons w/o 6,520 42.3 3,298 12.9 2,336 30.7 981 7.8 4,184 53.6 2,317 17.9 
formal educ. 
Unknown 75 0.5 .6 0.0 33 0.4 
C
O
 o
 0.0 41 0.5 0.3 
o
 
o
 
Total 15,405 100.0 25,603 100.0 7,603 100.0 12,651 100.0 7,802 100.0 12,952 100.0 
^Economic Planning Board. Referred to in Kim and Park (1985). 
'^Classified by the number of years in school as the following: Primary school for 1-6 years of 
schooling; middle school for 7-9 years of schooling; high school for 10-12 years of schooling; junior 
college for 13-14 years of schooling; and university, college, and above for 15 years and over in 
school. 
^The population with unknown age is not included. 
16 
Capital Formation 
Domestic capital accumulation is a necessary condition for economic 
growth, employment expansion, and enhancement of labor productivity. 
Korea's gross domestic investment was less than 15 percent of the GNP 
until 1965, except for the years 1957 and 1963. Since the mid-1960s the 
ratio of gross domestic investment to GNP rose by above 20 percent and 
reached a high of 30 percent by the late 1970s, as shown in Table 2.7. 
There are two ways to finance the increase in gross domestic 
investment. One way is to increase domestic saving, and the other way is 
to import foreign capital. Until 1962, the gross domestic saving rate 
was less than 5 percent of the GNP. Since 1963, it increased rapidly to 
18.2 percent in the early 1970s and exceeded 26.0 percent in the peak 
years of 1978 to 1979. The deceleration of the economic growth rate was 
attributed to the decline of the domestic saving rate (20.3 percent) in 
the early 1980s. The domestic gross saving has shown a large 
contribution to gross domestic investment since 1963. The share of the 
gross domestic investment financed by gross domestic saving was about 34 
percent in the early 1960s. It then rose to 75 percent by the early 
1970s. 
The inflow of foreign capital may be very sensitive to the real 
interest rate differential, the balance of payments situation, and the 
domestic saving-investment gap. This foreign capital inflow shows large 
fluctuations as shown in table 2-7. The average ratio of foreign saving 
to GNP was 9.9 percent during the period from 1961 through 1963, which is 
greater than the 7.7 percent in the period from 1954 through 1956. This 
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Table 2-7. Trends in the ratio of sectoral gross saving to GNP, 1954-82^^ 
(in percent) 
Gross Domestic Saving Rate 
Year Govt. Business Hshld Total^ 
Foreign 
Saving 
Rate 
Statistical 
Discrepancy 
Gross Saving 
=Gross Domestic 
Investment 
1954 -2.7 5.0 4.4 6.6 5.3 11.9 
1955 -2.3 4.3 3.2 5.2 7.0 — 12.2 
1956 -2.9 4.4 -3.4 -2.0 10.9 — mm 8.9 
1957 -3.0 4.5 4.1 5.5 9.8 — — 15.3 
1958 -3.1 5.0 3.0 4.8 8.1 — — 12.9 
1959 -2.7 5.7 1.2 4.2 6.9 11.2 
1960 -2.0 5.3 -2.5 0.8 8.6 1.5 10.9 
1961 -1.8 5.9 -1.3 2.9 8.6 1.7 13.2 
1962 -1.5 7.1 -2.3 3.3 10.7 -1.1 12.8 
1963 -0.4 7.1 2.0 8.7 10.4 -1.0 18.1 
1964 0.5 6.5 1.8 8.7 6.9 -1.6 14.0 
1965 1.7 7.7 -2.1 7.4 6.4 1.2 15.0 
1966 2.8 7.5 1.6 11.8 8.4 1.3 21.6 
1967 4.1 7.9 -0.6 11.4 8.8 1.7 21.9 
1968 6.1 7.8 1.1 15.1 11.2 -0.4 25.9 
1969 5.9 7.7 5.2 18.8 10.6 -0.6 28.8 
1970 6.5 7.5 3.4 17.3 9.3 0.2 26.8 
1971 5.4 7.5 2.5 15.4 10.7 -0.8 25.2 
1972 3.6 9.1 3.0 15.7 5.2 0.7 21.7 
1973 4.2 11.4 7.9 23.5 3.8 -1.7 25.6 
1974 2.3 12.1 6.1 20.5 12.4 -1.9 31.0 
1975 4.0 11.3 3.4 18.6 10.4 0.4 29.4 
1976 6.2 10.9 6.0 23.1 2.4 -0.0 25.5 
1977 5.6 10.9 8.6 25.1 0.6 1.6 27.3 
1978 6.5 9.9 10.0 26.4 3.3 1.5 31.1 
1979 7.2 9.7 9.7 26.6 7.6 1.2 35.4 
1980 6.2 8.2 5.5 19.9 10.2 1.4 31.5 
1981 6.7 8.3 4.6 19.6 7.9 0.9 28.4 
1982 6.7 9.7 5.1 21.5 4.8 -0.1 26.2 
Average for period: 
54-56 -2.6 4.6 1.4 3.3 7.7 — — 11.0 
61-63 -1.2 6.7 -0.5 5.0 9.9 -0.1 14.8 
71-73 4.4 9.3 4.5 18.2 6.6 -0.6 24.2 
80-82 6.5 8.7 5.1 20.3 7.6 0.7 28.7 
^The Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea, 1982. 
^Based on the current price series. 
^Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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ratio declined to 6.6 percent during 1971 through 1973, but increased 
again to almost 7.6 percent in 1980 through 1982 because of the sharp 
increase in world oil prices in 1979 and 1980. 
Table 2-8 shows the current trend for the gross saving and gross 
investment. It is striking that the outflow of domestic capital occurs. 
This is indicative of the unprecedented event-current account surplus^. 
Sectoral contributions to the domestic capital formation are 
presented in Table 2-9. Note that both the government and business 
sectors have contributed most to the increase in domestic saving since 
the mid-1960s. The government sector shows a positive contribution to 
the gross domestic saving since 1964. The average annual government 
saving ratio to gross domestic investment was about 22.9 percent in 1980 
through 1982, which was greater than 18.2 percent in 1971 through 1973. 
This result implies that the government has played a very important role 
in domestic capital formation. The average business saving ratio to 
gross domestic investment was about 41.8 percent during the period 1954 
through 1956. In the early 1960s, it increased to about 45.3 percent. 
The portion of the business saving to GNP was about 6.7 percent during 
this period. The business saving ratio to gross domestic investment was 
about 38.4 percent in the period from 1971 through 1973. In the early 
1980s, it declined to 30.8 percent, but was still much larger than that 
^Following the Keynesian absorption approach, Current Account = 
(Saving - Investment) + (Tax - Government Spending). Given balanced 
budget in the government sector, current account equals the saving 
investment gap. 
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Table 2-8. Current trend for the saving and investment^ 
(in billion won) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
GROSS SAVING 12,197.9 16 ,486.1 20, 120.6 22, 329.2 29 ,115.5 36 ,453.4 
Private 9,077.4 12,218.6 15,437.9 17,277.6 23,378.7 29,626.7 
Non-financial 4,187.9 5,920.7 6,690.4 7,607.2 10,277.3 » V 
corporate enterprises 
Financial institutions -152.0 250.2 614.1 480.4 409.2 — 
Individuals 5,041.5 6,047.7 8,133.4 9,190.0 12,692.2 
General government 3,120.5 4,267.5 4,682.7 5,051.6 5,736.8 6,826.7 
GROSS INVESTMENT 12,555.1 16,357.1 20,111.0 21,886.6 29,021.7 36,997.6 
Gross domestic capital formation 14,509.6 17,620.8 21,207.3 22,644.8 24,983.0 29,022.9 
Private 12,180.0 14,873.8 18,027.5 19,218.3 21,647.6 25,304.3 
Non-financial 10,059.7 11,289.7 12,931.1 14,798.6 17,136.7 —  — —  
corporate enterprises 
Financial institutions 566.9 303.8 394.5 344.2 329.2 
Individuals 1,543.4 3,280.3 4,701.9 4,075.5 4,181.7 
General government 2,329.6 2,747.0 3,179.8 3,426.5 3,335.4 3,718.6 
Net lending to the rest -1,954.5 -1,263.7 -1,096.3 -758.2 4,038.7 7,974.7 
of the world 
STATISTICAL DISCREPANCY -357.2 129.0 9.6 442.6 93.8 -544.2 
*The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1988. 
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Table 2-9. Trends in the composition of gross saving by sector, 1954-82® 
(in percent) 
Gross Domestic Saving Rate statistical Gross Saving 
Year Govt. Business Hshld Tota, 
1954 -22.8 41.8 36.7 55.7 44.3 -- 100.0 
1955 -19.1 35.5 26.2 42.6 57.4 100.0 
1956 -32.6 48.9 -37.8 -22.2 122.2 — — 100.0 
1957 -19.9 29.5 26.5 36.1 63.9 —— 100.0 
1958 -24.2 38.6 23.1 37.5 62.5 — — 100.0 
1959 -24.3 51.0 11.1 37.1 62.1 — —' 100.0 
1960 -18.8 49.2 -22.9 7.5 78.9 13.5 100.0 
1961 -14.1 45.0 -9.6 21.4 65.4 13.2 100.0 
1962 -12.1 55.4 -17.8 25.5 83.3 -8.8 100.0 
1963 -2.0 39.0 11.0 48.0 57.5 -5.4 100.0 
1964 3.3 46.0 12.9 62.2 48.8 -11.1 100.0 
1965 11.4 51.6 -14.0 49.1 42.6 8.3 100.0 
1966 12.8 34.8 7.3 54.8 39.1 6.0 100.0 
1967 18.7 35.8 -2.6 51.9 40.2 7.9 100.0 
1968 23.6 30.3 4.4 58.3 43.1 -1.4 100.0 
1969 20.5 26.9 17.9 65.3 36.8 -2.2 100.0 
1970 24.3 27.8 12.5 64.7 34.7 0.6 100.0 
1971 21.4 29.6 9.8 60.9 42.5 -3.4 100.0 
1972 16.4 42.0 14.0 72.5 24.2 3.3 100.0 
1973 16.3 44.7 31.0 92.0 14.8 -6.8 100.0 
1974 7.3 39.0 19.7 66.0 40.0 -6.0 100.0 
1975 13.6 38.3 11.4 63.3 35.5 1.2 100.0 
1976 24.2 42.9 23.5 90.6 9.5 -0.1 100.0 
1977 20.5 39.9 31.7 92.1 2.2 5.7 100.0 
1978 20.8 31.7 32.2 84.7 10.6 4.7 100.0 
1979 20.4 27.4 27.3 75.1 21.6 3.3 100.0 
1980 19.6 26.1 17.4 63.2 32.4 4.4 100.0 
1981 23.6 29.1 16.4 69.1 27.9 3.0 100.0 
1982 25.5 37.1 19.5 82.1 18.4 -0.5 100.0 
Average for period: 
54-56 -23.6 41.8 12.7 30.0 70.0 « 100.0 
61-63 -8.1 45.3 -3.4 33.8 66.9 -0.7 100.0 
71-73 18.2 38.4 18.6 75.2 27.3 -2.5 100.0 
80-82 22.9 30.8 17.8 71.5 26.2 2.3 100.0 
®The Bank of Korea, National Income in Korea, 1982. 
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of the government and the household. On the other hand, household saving 
showed a large fluctuation compared to the government and the business 
sectors. The reason for this difference is that household saving 
includes saving in the form of addition to grain inventories, which 
usually fluctuates annually with the level of major food output in Korea. 
In summary, the business sector has maintained the leading role in 
capital accumulation in Korea. 
We are now in a position to discuss the allocation of gross domestic 
investment by the industrial sector. Annual fixed investment for 
selected periods is shown in Table 2-10. The sectoral cumulative fixed 
investment shows a stable pattern since 1962; the share of gross fixed 
investment allocated to the primary sector was about 9 percent during two 
decades. During this period, the manufacturing sector and the social 
overhead and other service sector's share of gross fixed investment was 
about 24 percent and 67 percent, respectively. 
This relatively stable pattern of resource allocation by a major 
sector implies that economic development, led by the growth of the 
manufacturing sector, was made possible not only by the rapid expansion 
of investment in that sector but also by complementary contributions of 
the other sectors to the manufacturing sector. 
Table 2-11 makes it clear that the capital formation in the 
manufacturing sector and service sectors (finance, insurance, real 
estate, and business services) increased very rapidly in short time 
period (1982-1986), whereas, the primary sector showed slow capital 
22 
Table 2-10. Investment allocation for selective periods® 
(in billion won) 
Primary Manufac- Social Overhead Total 
Sector turing and Services^ 
Cumulative fixed investment*^ 
1953-1961 225.3 476.6 1,142.3 1,844.2 
(12.2) (25.8) (62.0) (100.0) 
1962-1971 858.9 2,325.4 6,313.4 9,497.7 
(9.0) (24.5) (66.5) (100.0) 
1972-1981 3,253.3 8,139.1 24,433.4 35,825.8 
(9.1) (22.7) (68.2) (100.0) 
1953-1981 4,337.5 10,941.1 31,889.1 47.167.7 
(9.2) (23.2) (67.6) (100.0) 
®Bank of Korea; National Income in Korea. 1982. 
^The percentage composition of cumulative fixed investment by 
major sector is shown in prices. 
^Includes the construction industry. 
formation. The sector for construction showed a declining trend for 
capital formation, which implies the effects of the current recession in 
the construction industry. 
The Current Open Macroeconomic Issues 
The recent macroeconomic performance of the Korean economy has been 
outstanding. The Korean economy registered a remarkable growth rate of 
12.5 percent in 1986. Strikingly, in 1986, the national current account 
shifted from a chronic deficit to a surplus that amounted to $4.62 
Table 2-11. Composition of capital formation by kind of economic activity^ 
(in billion won) 
At 1980 Constant Prices 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 12,820.1 15,016.9 16,617.5 17,355.7 20,019.9 
Industries 10,895.0 12,773.6 14,098.5 14,705.6 17,434.2 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 853.2 1,085.4 1,197.6 1,120.8 1,389.2 
Mining and quarrying 105.8 107.8 121.1 132.6 135.6 
Manufacturing 2,694.3 2,754.6 3,675.5 4,494.7 5,855.6 
Electricity, gas and water 1,306.6 1,582.7 1,411.2 1,423.2 1,520.6 
Construction 383.7 352.8 433.7 432.2 361.5 
Wholesale & retail trade, rest. & hotel 754.9 574.8 722.8 731.3 1,010.6 
Transport, storage, communication 1,551.4 2,304.0 2,193.8 2,318.1 2,403.1 
Finance, insurance, real estate, 
and business services 2,896.5 3,685.3 3,913.0 3,664.8 4,278.4 
Community, social & personal services 3386 326.2 429.8 387.9 479.6 
Producers of government services 1,925.1 2,243.3 2,519.0 2,650.1 2,585.7 
Public administration & defense 1,232.9 1,619.3 1,661.1 1,755.4 1,641.3 
Social, recreational, sanitary and 
related community services 476.9 489.7 597.4 701.8 689.7 
Others 215.3 134.3 260.5 192.9 254.7 
Increase in stocks -266.9 -271.9 874.6 413.4 -367.9 
GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION 12,553.2 14,745.0 17,492.1 17,769.1 19,652.0 
^The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1988. 
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billion (5 percent of the GNP), as shown in Table 2-12. This significant 
event of current account surplus, which Korean economic policy makers had 
never confronted, has led to some political and economic issues and 
problems. Note that the improvement in the current account was 
accompanied by bilateral trade imbalances: a growing trade surplus with 
the United States since 1982 and a widening deficit with Japan. The 
Washington response to this trade imbalance with Korea is very plain: 
import liberalization, capital account liberalization, exchange rate 
appreciation, raising real wages, cutting taxes, and so on. 
It is interesting to examine the sources of the current account 
surplus of the Korean economy in 1986. The world economic environment 
was unusually favorable to the Korean economy in 1986: the collapse of 
oil prices, the Japanese Yen appreciation, and the Korean won 
depreciation. Mahn-Je Kim and Sung-Tae Ro (1989) argued that "these 
three blessings" have contributed to the 1985-86 improvement in the 
balance of payments by 90 percent.^ This implies the vulnerability of 
the Korean economy to external shocks. 
Most Korean economists are dubious about the sustainability of the 
current account surplus. They are worried about future external shocks 
^The changes in world economic conditions in 1986 have been popu­
larly dubbed the "three blessings." The "three blessings" are the 
collapse of oil prices, the Japanese Yen appreciation, and the decline in 
international interest rates. Note that the Korean economy imports 100 
percent of its crude oil and also is ranked as the fourth largest 
developing country debtor. According to Kim and Ro (1989), the overall 
impact of the strong Yen on GNP and the current account was definitely 
positive. They also argued that the drop in oil prices improved the 
current account balance by 54.5 percent of the total surplus. 
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Table 2-12. Macroeconotnic performance of Korea, 1984-87^ 
First Half 
1984 1985 1986 of 1987 
GNP growth 8.4 5.4 12.5 15.3 
Consumption 5.2 5.1 6.7 7.5 
Fixed capital formation 10.7 4.4 15.0 14.7 
Commodity exports 11.5 3.6 26.3 26.1 
Commodity imports 11.3 -0.7 19.7 21.5 
GNP deflator 3.8 4.1 2.3 2.0 
Wholesale prices 0.7 0.9 -2.2 -0.5 
Consumer prices 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 
Valus, billion dollars 
Current account balance -1.37 -0.89 4.62 4.15 
Trade balance -1.04 -0.02 4.21 2.98 
Exports 26.33 26.44 33.91 20.68 
Imports 27.37 26.46 29.71 17.70 
Invisible trade balance and 
net transfers -0.34 -0.87 0.41 1.17 
^The Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin (June 1989). 
'^GNP and inflation figures represent the percentage change 
from the same period of the previous year. 
that are unfavorable to the Korean economy. Tensions in the Middle East 
may cause oil prices to rise. If the U.S. would cut its trade deficit, 
there would be serious adverse effects on Korean exports because the U.S. 
is the largest purchaser of Korean exports. Current labor turmoil 
disrupts the production of automobiles, ships, electronics, and 
footwear—all crucial export items. Labor disputes could have two 
negative effects on the Korean economy. One is that the sharp rises in 
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wage rates will erode Korea's competitiveness. The other is that many 
American buyers will turn to Taiwan or other developing countries for a 
more stable supply of manufactured goods. Contrary to the views of the 
Korean economists, Dornbush (1989) argued that the Korean external 
balance shows all the signs of a trend toward surpluses. He indicated 
that, even with a rising share of investment in GDP, there was a very 
significant increase in savings and, hence, an improvement in the 
external balance. His argument is based upon a Keynesian framework of 
income-expenditure analysis. Note that this Keynesian absorption 
approach is valid in circumstances such as fixed prices and excess 
capacity. 
Even though Korean economists think that current account surpluses, 
like deficits, are external imbalances and should be adjusted on the 
grounds of economic welfare, there are many constraints on macroeconomic 
adjustment policies in Korea. At the end of 1986, Korea's gross foreign 
debt amounted to $44.5 billion, equivalent to 46.8 percent of GNP, 
placing Korea fourth among the world's debtor nations.^ This external 
debt problem places some restrictions on adjustment policies. The Korean 
government wants to reduce the external debt to about 20 percent of GNP 
by 1991, the level found in many problem-free debtor countries. 
To reduce the current account surplus, the Keynesian absorption 
approach is recommended. Note that this approach is valid in a world 
^For more details about statistics, see Kim and Ro (1989). 
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where fixed prices and excess capacity are assumed. Policies that tend 
to increase absorption are not appropriate in the presence of rising 
prices and high growth rate, which the Korean economy currently shows. 
The drastic import liberalization plan may hurt the Korean economy 
very seriously. As we have already argued, the Korean economies were 
accustomed to the export-oriented industrialization strategy so that the 
accelerated market opening and cuts in tariffs would threaten the 
stability of the Korean economy. 
The current labor problems are apparent obstacles to the 
macroeconomic adjustment policies. Labor disputes may cause Korean 
exporters to lose buyers and their competitiveness over foreign exporters 
because of the increase in wage rates. 
Kim and Ro (1989) have argued that the role of exchange rate policy 
for surplus management is limited, in the sense that the Korean won is 
not so undervalued as to justify a drastic appreciation. In addition, 
the effects of exchange rate changes on the balance of payments are 
ambiguous and controversial.^ In contrast, Williamson (1989) argued 
that the real equilibrium exchange rate of any fast-growing economy would 
tend to appreciate systematically over time because of the productivity 
bias. In addition, he pointed out that sitting on an undervalued 
exchange rate long enough may invite a wage explosion. 
The new experience of a current account surplus has brought about 
macroeconomic issues, both domestically and internationally, which Korean 
^For more details about this argument, see Kim and Ro (1989). 
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policymakers have never before met. Internally, the current account 
surplus caused the money supply to increase, which resulted in price 
instability. Externally, the Korean economy has received the market 
opening pressure from its major trade partners. Under these 
circumstances, the Korean government has showed its endeavor to 
accelerate the free trade economy: Korean policymakers formulated and 
announced a comprehensive program of surplus management on 17 April 
1987.® The major contents of the program are summarized as follows. 
First, Korea has taken specific measures to keep the free trade 
principles. In 1981, Korea embarked on an ambitious liberalization 
program and carried it out continuously, despite structural constraints. 
This program has been accelerated since 1985, the year in which Korea 
showed its first current account surplus. This market opening program 
contains the following issues: 1) automatic import license approval 
drastically expanded (94.7 percent import liberalization ratio in 1988); 
2) slashed tariffs; 3) streamlined import procedures; 4) legal reforms 
for intellectual property rights; 5) an opening service sector (banking 
services, insurance market, advertising market, etc.); and 6) 
agricultural market moves toward greater liberalization. 
Second, to get rid of bilateral trade imbalances with the U.S., 
Korea initiated specific and unprecedented programs to accelerate imports 
from the U.S. The Korean government provides foreign currency loans to 
®For more details, see The Republic of Korea (1989). 
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increase imports of capital goods, equipment, and raw materials from 
countries that have a trade deficit with Korea, most notably from the 
United States. 
Third, the government will take measures to restrain exports of low 
value-added products that increase Korean export volume without providing 
substantial benefits to the Korean economy. Furthermore, the government 
will intensify import and export diversification. 
Fourth, public-sector investment will be expanded to promote more 
balanced growth of the economy. Infrastructure investment for the 
agricultural sector will also be increased. 
Fifth, regardless of the validity of the won appreciation, the 
Korean government appreciated the won. The value of the won rose by 15.8 
percent in 1988. 
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CHAPTER III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) has been a major building block for 
the monetary approach to exchange rate determination during the 1970s and 
1980s. The monetary economists have viewed the PPP doctrine as a simple 
extension of the traditional Quantity Theory of Money to the open 
economy. But this approach has been attacked on empirical grounds 
(Dornbush, 1980; Daniel, 1986). 
Cassel (1916) argued that the rate of exchange between two countries 
is primarily determined by the quotient between each country's real 
purchasing power of money. He also proposed to call this real parity 
"The Purchasing Power Parity." But this kind of PPP notion has been 
traced to the 16th century (see Einzig, 1962). The proponents of PPP 
asserted that the exchange rate would be set to equilibrate to a ratio of 
aggregate price indices for the two countries or that the percentage 
change in the exchange rate should equal the difference between the 
percentage rates of inflation in the two countries. 
Note that both the exchange rate and each country's aggregate price 
level are determined simultaneously and endogenously in the real world. 
Considering this simultaneity and endogeneity of the exchange rate and 
aggregate price level, the PPP would be regarded as the equilibrium 
relationship of each country's real purchasing power rather than a 
precise theory of exchange rate determination. 
In Section 1, we will discuss the theoretical formulation for PPP. 
In Section 2, we will also review purchasing power disparity from the 
31 
theoretical point of view. In Section 3, we will show empirical 
evidence for both the failure of PPP and the support for RPR. In Section 
4, we will discuss the implications for the deviations from PPP. Lastly, 
we will derive the real exchange rate in terms of monetary shocks and 
real shocks by using Dornbush's discrete time version model. 
Theoretical Review for PPP 
The pure theory of international trade says that 1) autarkic price 
difference in the same good between countries would occur by the factor 
endowment difference (Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson theorem) or technological 
difference (Ricardian theory) and 2) in the assumed absence of transport 
costs and trade restrictions, price of the homogeneous good would be 
equalized by trade between countries. 
This spatial arbitrage of law of one price is the basis for the 
strong or absolute version of RPR in an integrated, competitive market 
system. As Dornbush (1985) argued, the law of one price for individual 
goods extends to the aggregate price levels when 1) domestic price index 
function has the same functional form with the foreign price index 
function and 2) the same goods enter each country's market basket. 
In this context, the spatial arbitrage of the law of one price takes 
the following formula of the strong or absolute version of RPR. 
(1) ep* = p, 
where e denotes the number of units of domestic currency per unit of 
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foreign currency, p* indicates the foreign price level, and p indicates 
the domestic price level. 
In equation (1), the left-hand side is the foreign price level, 
which is expressed in domestic currency units. 
This absolute version of PPP implies that the real exchange rate 
(ep*/p) is 1 at all time spans. If we would restrict ourselves into 
the very hypothetical economy—in which each country produces homogeneous 
goods within a perfect competition market system in which there are no 
trade restrictions, no transportation costs, no informational barriers, 
and there is an internationally identical price index function—then we 
could not elicit any objection to equation (1) as a theoretical 
statement. 
In reality, this hypothetical economic environment is not true. 
Trade impediments cause the real exchange rate to deviate from its 
* 
long-run real exchange rate =1). 
With no trade obstacles, perfect commodity arbitrage ensures that 
the law of one price prevails throughout the world. Notice that the 
failure of the law of one price for each good does not mean market 
failure. Market efficiency would be obtained provided that the price 
system could capture all of the trade impediment costs. Trade 
impediments themselves do not indicate market inefficiency. 
Even though the law of one price would not prevail in the real 
world, it will not preclude the fact that the domestic price level is 
highly correlated with the foreign price level in common currency units. 
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The weak or relative version of PPP relies on the Cassel-Ricardo 
Neutral-Money Version of PPP. As Cassel (1916) said, in the presence of 
unusually different rates of money supply ratio between countries during 
a wartime, the rate of exchange should be expected to deviate from its 
old parity in proportion to the inflation rate of each country. 
As Samuel son (1964) argued, Cassel's PPP doctrine simply meant that 
the economy was in a standard money neutrality proposition. The absolute 
price level of all goods could double or halve without affecting the 
relative price ratio and thus the real resource allocation pattern. 
The weak or relative version of PPP states that the percentage 
change in the exchange rate equals the percentage change in the relative 
price ratios between two countries. This statement has taken the 
following form: 
(2) ep* = rp 
where r could be any constant. In other words: e = p - p*, where a a  
denotes a percentage change. 
Note that r is any constant reflecting the given obstacles to trade. 
As we have already argued, PPP theory is an equilibrium relationship 
between the domestic price level (P) and the foreign price level (ep*), 
rather than the exchange rate determination. In the time series context, 
if there is an equilibrium relationship between p and ep*, there should 
exist a unique cointegrating vector which makes the linear combination of 
ep* and p stationary (Enders, 1988). In this case, p and ep* could be 
nonstationary stochastic processes. 
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In a strict sense, the absolute or strong version of PPP would not 
hold because the price index function would be different internationally 
and each country would produce different kinds of goods; furthermore, 
there would be trade obstacles in a different way between countries. On 
the other hand, the relative version of PPP may hold in a weak sense if 
there is no money illusion in the economy. The constant r in the 
relative version of PPP would be a way of circumventing the qualifica­
tions arising from any obstacles to the absolute version of PPP. 
The next issue is what kind of price index is appropriate in 
calculation of PPP. If we believe in money neutrality, any kind of price 
index, such as wholesale price indexes, consumer price indexes. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) deflators, production cost indexes, or relative 
export price indexes, can be used in calculation of PPP. 
Samuel son (1964) argued that the relative export price indexes would 
not be appropriate for calculating PPP. But if we interpret that p 
(domestic price level) is the price of exportables and ep* (foreign 
price level) is the price of importables, then the real exchange rate 
(ep*/p) is the relative price of importable goods in terms of 
exportable goods. In the context of money neutrality, the relative price 
of importable goods would not be changed by the monetary disturbances. 
In a Ricardian framework, Samuel son (1964) argued that production 
cost parity would not be appropriate in the sense that the borderline 
goods would be changed by the demand shock in some countries.^ The 
^For more details see Samuel son, 1964. 
35 
change in borderline goods causes the change in exchange rate. 
Interpreting Houthakker's production cost parity as the production cost 
index parity, Houthakker's production cost parity could be used in 
calculation of PPP. If we restrict ourselves within an artificial 
economy with constant returns to scale technology and perfect competition 
market structure, the marginal cost (market price) of any good is the 
function of only the factor prices. Note that a money neutral economy 
does not alter the relative factor prices and thus does not change the 
price level, which is the marginal cost of any good. 
In short, none of these price indexes would matter in a money 
neutral economy. 
Note that the constant r in the relative version of PPP is a 
function of economic environment, such as trade obstacles, demand 
condition, and the change of relative efficiency of labor. In an 
empirical study, we have to give attention to choosing the particular 
time span. The time span we choose may consist of different economic 
environments, which gives rise to a misleading PPP. Samuel son (1964) 
argued this situation in the following way. If some economic balance 
such as trade balance is the function of real exchange rate, that is, 
F(W/Rw) = 0, where W/Rw = p/ep* and W and w denote unit labor costs at 
home and abroad in the respective currencies, then the function F could 
change. 
As stated by Samuel son (1964, p. 153), "Naive PPP must assume that 
the function F is not a function with time. Sophisticated PPP asserts 
that F has not changed much or estimates how it has changed. Unless very 
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sophisticated, indeed, PPP is a misleadingly pretentious doctrine, 
promising us what is rare in economics, detailed numerical predictions." 
Purchasing Power Disparities (Theoretical Review) 
Deviations from PPP can be explained several different ways. In 
this section, we first consider structural departures from PPP which 
cause equilibrium relative prices to change. The second thing we 
consider is transitory deviations from PPP. These transitory deviations 
from PPP are usually the result of the differential speed adjustment of 
prices in goods and assets markets. In addition to these deviations from 
PPP, econometric misspecification can yield misleading PPP estimates. 
Balassa (1964) indicated the structural deviations from PPP by 
emphasizing the importance of nonmonetary factors in the process of price 
determination. In a Ricardian framework, he argued that the currency of 
the country with higher productivity was highly overvalued relative to 
that of the country with lower productivity. According to his argument, 
a very substantial overvaluation of the dollar can not be wholly 
attributed to statistical defects of the calculation. But the critical 
assumption of his argument is that there is a sectoral difference of 
technology between traded and nontraded goods. With internationally 
smaller difference of technology in the service (a nontraded good) sector 
and perfect factor mobility within each country (equalized wages within 
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each country), services will be relatively more expensive in countries 
with higher levels of productivity.^ 
In the presence of nontraded goods with technological differences 
between countries, the law of one price for all goods in the economy does 
not hold. Note that the law of one price is the basis for the strong or 
absolute version of PPP. In this way, Balassa pointed out the existence 
of systematic differences between purchasing power and exchange rates. 
The validity of the relative version of PPP was criticized by 
Balassa (1964) in the following sense. The process of technological 
improvement and wage adjustment speed is the key factor in determining 
the general price level in each country. But these processes do not 
follow the same course in every country, so the causation does not run 
from the change in the relative general price level to the change in the 
exchange rate. 
In the previous line of framework, the growing country's relative 
price level will increase (Dornbush, Fischer, and Samuel son, 1977). A 
uniform rise in traded goods productivity at home will increase the wages 
in that sector, which implies a nationwide wage increase. With no 
productivity gains in the nontraded goods sector, the price of nontraded 
goods will increase, which results in the increase in the relative price 
level. Thus, real factors (nonmonetary factors) can induce systematic 
deviations from PPP. 
In the context of a relative factor endowment difference between 
countries (Hecksher-Ohlin Samuel son framework, 2=good 2=factor model), 
Bhagwati (1984) explained the reason why services are cheaper in the poor 
countries. 
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In addition to the structural departures from PPP, we are now in a 
position to explain the relatively persistent and often large deviations 
from PPP. Dornbush (1976) argued that exchange rate overshooting would 
arise from the differential adjustment speed of markets. That is, 
exchange rates and asset markets adjust quickly relative to goods 
markets. The validity of his argument is that wage levels are determined 
by long-term labor contracts, whereas exchange rates behave like asset 
prices. Monetary disturbances could cause the real exchange to deviate 
from the long-run level even though money is neutral in the long run. 
Market imperfections can cause the real exchange rate to deviate 
from its long-run level. A monopolistic competition market structure 
could be desirable if it enhanced product variety; Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) show how this market structure could be welfare improving. With 
this market structure and only one factor (labor) with linear technology, 
each firm can set prices as a fixed and common markup over wages. Then 
the real exchange rate (ep*/p) is expressed as (ew*/w). Considering 
wage stickiness, flexible exchange rate movement can cause the real 
exchange rate to deviate from its long-run level. 
In the context of imperfectly competitive markets and exchange rate 
volatility, Dornbush (1987) argued that the extent of price adjustment 
depends on the product substitutability, the relative number of domestic 
and foreign firms, and market structure. His position is that the 
relative exchange rate deviates from its long-run level in the short run. 
Contrary to the standard monetary view that the real exchange rate is 
independent of exchange rate, his argument depends on the assumption of 
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sticky wages and exogenous exchange rate movements. Furthermore, he 
assumes that domestic and foreign goods are less than fully homogeneous 
and substitutable. 
Empirical Evidence (Two Divergent Views) 
Failure of PPP 
The law of one price was flagrantly and systematically violated by 
empirical data (Isard, 1977). Isard (1977) showed some evidence that 
exchange rate changes substantially alter the relative dollar equivalent 
prices of the most narrowly defined domestic and foreign manufactured 
goods for which prices can easily be matched. Furthermore, these 
relative price changes seem to persist for at least several years and can 
not be shrugged off as transitory. In this context, he casts doubt on 
forming the aggregate price index which obeys the law of one price. 
Kravis and Lipsey (1978) have also shown tests of the law of one 
price on very disaggregated manufactured goods. Their evidence is that 
there are substantial deviations from the law of one price even for 
traded goods. Their empirical study supports Balassa's (1964) hypothesis 
of structural deviations from PPP. Balassa's evidence is that the higher 
a country's relative per capita GDP, the higher its relative price 
level. 
Hsieh (1982) has formed the determination of the real exchange rate 
by using the productivity approach with Ricardian framework. He 
emphasizes the real factors in the determination of real exchange rates. 
His argument is that if real factors are as important in exchange rate 
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determination as the nominal forces, then the monetary approach to 
exchange rate determination can explain only part of the movement of 
exchange rates. His econometric results are consistent with his view. 
Eventually, his work has supported Balassa's hypothesis of structural 
deviations from PPP. 
Dornbush (1985) has argued that, once real exchange rate (ep*/p) 
has followed random walk, PPP performance will depend upon the particular 
price index chosen for comparison. In his empirical study, he has used 
GDP deflators because they have a clear methodological definition. His 
empirical study said that relative GDP deflators expressed in a common 
currency unit are far from constant, which implies that the weak version 
of PPP does not hold. He has shown some evidence that PPP performance 
depends upon different price indices (CPIs, WPIs, and GDP deflators) in 
case real exchange rate movement is nonstationary. That is, different 
price indices yield a different correlation of inflation rates expressed 
in U.S. dollars. The striking fact is that this result depends upon 
whether the data are quarterly or annual. 
Frenkel (1981) has indicated two sources for the deviations from 
PPP. One is the real shocks to the economic system, which causes the 
relative price to change. He argued that the purchasing power 
disparities during the 1970s would be explained well by the real shocks 
(oil embargo, supply shocks, commodity booms and shortages, shifts in the 
demand for money, differential productivity growth). The other one is 
the different speed of adjustment between the price indices of goods and 
services and the exchange rate. The modern monetary approach to exchange 
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rate determination (Mussa, 1979) views the exchange rates as the relative 
prices of assets, which are fundamentally different from the price 
indices of goods and services. The exchange rates, like other asset 
prices, are very sensitive to the "news" which alters expectations 
concerning the future course of events. In this context, exchange rates 
reflect not only current circumstances but also reflect future events. 
Support for PPP 
Hakkio (1984) reexamined the PPP theory in a multi-exchange rate 
world. He argued that the failure of PPP would be the result of 
imprecise parameter estimates. That is, many of the empirical studies 
for purchasing power disparities use the bilateral exchange rate model, 
which ignores international interdependence. His multilateral exchange 
rate model does take into account the cross-sectional variability in the 
data set. By doing this, he was unable to reject the hypothesis that PPP 
theory holds in several currencies simultaneously. 
Edison (1987) asserted that a naive version of the PPP relationship 
did not adequately represent the exchange rate (dollar/pound). After 
taking into account the effects of changes in structural factors, he has 
supported the Ricardo-Cassel neutrality version of PPP in the long run. 
Contrary to the Keynesian theory, monetary approach to exchange rate 
determination asserts that exchange rate changes will be proportional to 
relative inflation rate. This assertion implies that the causation runs 
from the change in the relative inflation rate to the change in the 
exchange rate. Krugman (1978) pointed out that simple regression tests 
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lead people to reject the hypothesis of PPP. He also argued that the 
recognition of the endogeneity of both prices and exchange rates made PPP 
test results considerably more favorable, while not definitive, to PPP 
hypothesis. 
Frenkel (1981) argued that PPP theory worked well in the 1920s but 
not during the 1970s. Contrary to this view, Davutyan and Pippenger 
(1985) contended that PPP did not collapse during the 1970s. They argued 
that Frenkel's finding of the collapse of PPP during the 1970s was the 
result of an increase in the importance of real shocks relative to 
monetary shocks. In addition, they believe that PPP works at least as 
well under monetary stability as it does during inflation. 
Frankel (1985) found that the real exchange rate did not follow the 
random walk hypothesis in the long run. He was also unable to reject the 
random walk hypothesis in the short run. Thus, the hypothesis of the 
nonstationarity of the real exchange rate has not been established 
convincingly. 
Implications of Purchasing Power Disparity 
The deviations from purchasing power parity poses some macro-
economic issues. The issues considered are as follows. 
With strict PPP, there is no problem in comparing real incomes 
internationally. The failure of the relative version of PPP implies that 
the economies concerned are not in the money neutrality proposition. 
Then, there could be systematic deviations from PPP, which is the 
Balassa's hypothesis. That is, purchasing power disparity implies that 
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the relative prices between tradables and nontradables differ 
internationally. These internationally different relative prices can lead 
us to the distortion of international income comparison. As Samuel son 
(1974) argued, one country's real income relative to its counterparts 
could be overstated or understated depending on the chosen price index.^ 
Dornbush (1985) argued that real interest differential between 
* * 4 
countries equals the expected rate of real appreciation (R/R, R = p/ep ): 
r* = r + R/R 
where, r = domestic real interest rate, r* = foreign real interest rate, 
and R = , t; time subscript. 
If the relative version of PPP holds, R/R will vanish. Under no 
restrictions on capital mobility, real interest rates would become 
equalized across countries. 
As Dornbush (1985) found, we can postulate the actual real exchange 
rate adjustment mechanism as follows; R/R = (1/S)(R' - R), where R' is 
the trend level of real exchange rate and S is a constant. 
(3) R = R' + S(r - r*) 
Following the Keynesian absorption approach, if we assume that 
Y = f (R - R'), f' < 0, Y: Total GNP, then the policy implications would 
be as follows. Loosening monetary policy relative to its counterparts 
^See Samuel son (1974) for more details. 
^See Dornbush (1985) for more details. 
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will eventually cause real depreciation so that real output will increase. 
The mechanism would be that the increase in competitiveness because of 
both the decrease in real interest rate and real exchange rate 
depreciation dominates the cost factor with the real exchange rate 
depreciation. 
Notice that the real exchange rate is the relative price of home 
goods between countries provided that the price index function is the same 
across countries. Either persistent productivity differential or change 
in aggregate demand patterns makes the real exchange rate (relative price 
of home goods) nonstationary, which results in intrinsic differential real 
interest rate across countries. Along this argument, we say that the real 
interest rate in developing countries is lower than that of developed 
countries. 
The nonstationarity of the real exchange rate increases the portfolio 
diversification risk (Branson and Henderson, 1984). PPP deviations 
motivate the international portfolio diversification. If we assume the 
mean preserving spread for asset returns, then the nonstationarity of the 
real exchange rate will increase the risk premium. 
McKinnon (1988) has proposed a new monetary standard centered on 
fixed exchange rates between the Japanese yen, the German mark, and the 
U.S. dollar. His argument is summarized as follows (Dornbush, 1987). 
McKinnon's position is that fixed exchange rates are superior to 
flexible exchange rates in the sense that: 
1) With fixed exchanges, we can adjust to real disturbances and 
achieve price stability. 
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2) In the presence of incomplete commodity markets and exchange rate 
volatility resulting from money demand shocks, fixed exchange 
rates are socially preferably to flexible exchange rates. 
3) The real exchange rate could not affect the current account. 
4) PPP is a good nominal anchor to equilibrium exchange rates. 
5) World monetary growth should be targeted to achieve price level. 
Contrary to this argument, with a microtheoretical approach, Lapan 
and Enders (1980) argued that exchange regime comparison should be based 
on the people's preferences. Furthermore, in the presence of nontraded 
goods, they argued that the relative prices (tradables versus 
nontradables) are more stationary in the flexible exchange regime. 
One of Dornbush's (1987) arguments is that the trend changes in 
equilibrium real exchange rates between Europe, the U.S., and Japan occur 
because of the emergence of the newly industrialized countries like Korea, 
Brazil, and other trading countries. In this line of argument, our point 
is that if the real exchange rate (Korea versus the U.S., Japan, Germany) 
is nonstationary, then the PPP exchange rate (real exchange rate) can not 
be used as a nominal anchor to equilibrium exchange rates. 
If we interpret the real exchange rate as the relative price of 
importables in terms of exportables, then the nonstationarity of the real 
exchange rates makes the resource allocation pattern more complicated. 
Considering nontradable sectors, then the complexity of the resource 
allocation pattern would be strengthened. 
Note that PPP is the major building block for the monetary approach 
to exchange rate determination. The nonstationarity of the real exchange 
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rate implies that the exchange rate behavior suggested by the monetary 
approach is not appropriate. 
Real Exchange Rate Determination 
(Two-Country Version of the Dornbush Model) 
Most modern models of exchange rate determination suggest that any 
variety of monetary shocks can induce temporary but not permanent 
deviations from PPP. Real shocks, on the other hand, can induce changes 
in the real exchange rate; a real shock which is permanent can induce a 
permanent deviation from PPP. 
To prove these propositions, we have employed a discrete-time 
version of the Dornbush model (two-country version);^ 
m(t) - P(t) = - a"^r(t) + 6y(t) ... (1) 
[portfolio balance] 
m*(t) - P*(t) = - a"^ r*(t) + 6y*(t) ... (!') 
r(t) = r*(t) + e(t+l) - e(t) ... (2) [interest parity] 
P(t+1) - P(t) = b[e(t) + P*(t) - P(t)] -Yy(t) - fr(t) ... (3) 
[price adjustment] 
P*(t+1) - P*(t) = - b*[e(t)+P*(t)-P(t)] - y*y*(t) - fr*(t) ... (3') 
^Following Dornbush (1976) and Backus (1986), we have adapted the 
model in a two-country version. We have assumed the perfect foresight 
world. 
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where P and e denote the domestic prices and the nominal exchange rate, 
* denotes foreign country's counterpart, m denotes money supply, and r 
denotes the nominal interest rate. The term y(t) denotes a productivity 
shock (or income shock). All the parameters are positive constants. All 
variables but r are in logs. Price adjustment equations (3 and 3') 
represent the excess demand for domestic goods. For simplicity, we have 
assumed that both economies have the same parameter values in the portfol 
balance equation. 
To solve the model, we have to distinguish endogenous variables from 
exogenous variables. The endogenous variables are P(t), P*(t), e(t), 
r(t), and r*(t), whereas the exogenous variables are m(t), m*(t), y(t), 
and y*(t). 
Substituting (1) and (!') into (2), (3) and (3') yields the vector 
first-order difference equation; 
"e(t+l) -
P(t+1) 
P*(t+1) 
b (1-b-af) 
-b 
-â 
b 
b* (l-b*-af) 
e(t) • 
P(t) 
P*(t) 
a6(y(t)-y*(t))-a(m(t)-m*(t) )" 
-  ( Y+fa5)y(t) + fam(t) 
- ( *+faô)y*(t) + fam*(t) 
The stability condition in the vector difference equation restricts the 
parameter space. That is, j A - X-I | = 0, where 
A = b (1-b-af) 
-a 
b 
(1-b -af) 
the characteristic roots are less 
than 1 in absolute value. 
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Rewriting the above vector difference equation, then 
[. - al] 
e(t+l) 
P(t+1) = 
P*(t+1) 
a6(y(t) - y*(t) - a(m(t) - m*(t)) 
- (Y + fa6) y(t) + fam(t) 
- (Y* + fag) y*(t) + fam*(t) 
Multiplying (I - AL)"^ in both sides then yields 
e(t+l) 
P(t+1) 
P*(t+1) 
[i - al] -1 
a6Cy(t) - y*(t)] - a[m(t) - m*(t)] 
- (Y + fag) y(t) + fam(t) 
- (Y* + fag) y*(t) + fam*(t) 
where L is the lag operator. 
If we assume that the characteristic equation has three distinct 
roots (for example, | | ^  1, 1, | < D, then the paths of 
the price levels [P(t+1), P*(t+1)] and the nominal exchange rate are 
determined by the future, current, and past values of the relative money 
supply shocks and the relative productivity shocks.® 
We are now in a position to see the long-run properties of this 
model. Note that the "steady state" solution has the following 
properties: 
1) Money supply "shock" has a temporary but not permanent effect on 
real exchange rates. 
®To map all bounded sequences into bounded sequences, we applied 
(I-AL)"^ such that we choose the "backward" expansion if | X | < 1 and 
the forward expansion if ( A | > 1. 
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Proof 
We have already proved the fact that the time paths of e(t), P(t), 
P*(t) are determined by the future, current, and past values of 
monetary shock, which implies that monetary shock has a temporary effect 
on the real exchange rate [e(t) + P*(t) - P(t)]. 
We are now in a position to prove the second part of the 
proposition; monetary shock has no permanent effect on the real exchange 
rate. 
Consider the steady-state version of the model; 
where R = e + P - P, and bar denotes the superscript, which indicates 
the steady-state value of the variable. 
Manipulating (B3) and (B4) yields ^  and F; 
m - P = - a"^ r + 6 y ... (Bl) 
m - P = - a r + 6 y (B2) 
0  = b R - Y y -fr... (B3) 
0  = - b*R-Y*y* - f  r ... (B4) 
* _* * _* 
r 
Y y + Y y 
2? 
Substituting r into (Bl) yields P; 
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P = m - 6 y + a"^ 
_ * 
- ( y y  + Y y  
27 
Substituting r into (B2) yields P ; 
f m - 6 y + a -1 
_ * 
- (Y y + Y y ) 
27 
Substituting P and P into R, we can get e; 
e = Y y + Y^ y + (m - m*) - 6(y - 'y') 
b + b 
^2= 1, -^ = 1; it shows the conventional homogeneity 
9m 3m property. 
8R 
-^= 0; monetary shock has no permanent effect on the real 
3m exchange rate. Q E D 
2) Productivity shock (real shock) has a permanent effect on the 
real exchange rate. 
Proof 
— _ * 
-2 = —-—* , -3f = —* ; real shock does matter in the long 
y b + b y b + b run. q.E.o. 
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CHAPTER IV. UNIT ROOT AND COINTEGRATION 
TESTS OF PPP IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
The literature review suggests that there is considerable controversy 
concerning the appropriateness of the PPP assumption. To date, the vast 
majority of the empirical tests have concerned the U.S., European, and 
Japanese economies. In a sense, such tests are most favorable to PPP; the 
implicit assumption is that PPP should perform best between economies with 
similar industrial structures. However, this assumption may not be valid. 
As shown by Mussa (1979), PPP works well for nations experiencing very 
different inflation rates. Enders' (1989) study of PPP during the 
greenback and gold-standard periods shows that PPP works well for nations 
experiencing very rapid growth rates. 
In this light, it is interesting to consider the PPP relationship for 
the Korean economy. Korea represents a rapidly growing economy with 
strong trading ties to other Pacific Rim nations as well as to the U.S. 
and Europe. A comparison of the performance of PPP between Japan and 
Korea (both rapidly growing nations) might provide an interesting contrast 
to that of Korea versus other Pacific Rim nations and to Korea versus the 
U.S. The methodology that follows is that of Enders (1988, 1989) and 
Corbae and Ouliaris (1988). 
Unit Root Tests and the Real Exchange Rate 
To test the PPP relationship, consider the following econometric 
model : 
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(1) e(t)p*(t) - rp(t) = d(t) 
where e(t) = won price of the foreign currency in (t), p*(t) = foreign 
price level in (t), p(t) = Korean price level in (t), d(t) is a stochastic 
disturbance which represents a deviation from PPP, and r is a constant. 
Long-run PPP implies that r = 1 and d(t) is stationary with mean 
zero. Note that e, p, and p* are endogenous variables which are jointly 
determined; there is no obvious candidate for the left-hand side variable. 
To avoid the standard practice of estimating (1) by using instrumental 
variables, consider the reformulation of PPP in terms of the real exchange 
rate : 
(2) e(t)p*(t)/p{t) = r + di(t) 
r(t) = r + djCt) 
where dj^(t) is a stochastic disturbance and r(t) is the real exchange 
rate = e(t)p*(t)/p(t). 
In this formulation, long-run PPP holds if d^ft) is stationary; r 
is then the long-run value of the real exchange rate and d^ft) is the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its long-run value. 
The ARIMA model selection 
If d^ft) is an indeterministic covariance stationary stochastic 
process, by the Wold decomposition theorem, d^ft) has an infinite order 
moving average representation which can be well approximated by a finite 
autoregressive representation under certain conditions. 
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If, for example, d^ft) is finite ARIMA (n, 0, 0), the underlying 
process for the real exchange rate movement is suggested by: 
(3) r(t) = ag + air(t-l) + ... + apr(t-n) + ej^Ct) 
where e^ft) is a serially uncorrelated stochastic disturbance with mean 
equal to zero. 
Given this specification, long-run PPP requires that all 
characteristic roots of (3) lie within the unit circle. Because we can 
test only the relative version of PPP, the data place no restrictions on 
the estimated value of r. Using monthly data from International Financial 
Statistics, the real exchange rates for 6 of Korea's major trading 
partners—the U.S., Germany, Japan, India, the Philippines and Thailand-
were constructed. The sample period is January 1973 to July 1987 
(representing a period of flexible exchange rates). 
The data series for the U.S. real exchange rate was constructed by 
multiplying the U.S. wholesale price index by the won price of the dollar 
and then dividing by the Korean wholesale price index. In the same way, we 
have obtained the real exchange rates for other countries. 
Standard Box-Jenkins model selection procedures were used to 
characterize the nature of the djCt) series. This Box-Jenkins modeling 
strategy consists of three stages (identification, estimation, and 
diagnostic checking). The maximum likelihood estimates of the "best" ARIMA 
models for each country are reported in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1. Maximum likelihood ARIMA estimates 
r(t) = dg + otj^r(t-l) + Ogrft-E) + Ogrft-S) + el(t) 
January 1973-
July 1987 *0 *1 *2 *3 MU* 
U.S. 0.0235 0.9867 L 
(0.0738)° 
0.1838 
(0.1041) 
-0.1933 
(0.0739) 
1.0325 
Germany 0.0433 1.2499 
(0.0722) 
-0.2858 
(0.0725) 
1.2065 
Japan 0.0288 1.2216 
(0.0731) 
-0.2427 
(0.0740) 
• 1.3705 
Philippines 0.0464 0.9662 
(0.0166) 
1.3765 
India 0.0233 1.2605 
(0.0722) 
-0.2858 
(0.0722) 
0.9232 
Thailand 0.0406 0.9630 
(0.0190) 
1.1011 
®MU indicates mean level of the real exchange rate. 
^The standard errors are in parentheses. 
We are now in a position to determine whether the real exchange 
rates are stationary. Mann and Wald (1943) proved that the vector of 
least squares estimators for the nth-order stationary time series 
converges in distribution to a vector normal random variable. For the 
nonstationary time series, the story is different. The special case of 
nonstationary time series with multiple unit roots has been discussed by 
Dickey and Fuller (1979), Hasza and Fuller (1982), and Dickey, Hasza, and 
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Fuller (1984). In the presence of a single unit root, the standard 
Dickey-Fuller test is suggested by ARIMA representation.^ The Dickey-
Fuller test consists of rewriting equation (3) as: 
n 
(4) r(t) = a„ + b,r(t-l) + 2 b.delr(t+l-i) + e,(t) 0 i 1=2 1 1 
where: b, = E a.; b = - z a..,; delr(t+l-i) = r(t+l-i) - r(t-l) 
^ i=l 1 j=i J+i 
Dickey and Fuller show that the confidence intervals under the null 
hypothesis that b^ = 1 are larger than the standard confidence 
intervals under the null of no unit root. To reject the null of no 
b, - 1 
unit root, Dickey and Fuller calculate that (standard error^ must 
be greater than:^ 
Significance Level 
Obs. 0.01 0.05 0.10 
100 -3.51 -2.89 -2.58 
250 -3.46 -2.88 -2.57 
Unit root test results for the real exchange rate for each country 
are reported in Table 4-2. 
^Given a stochastic difference equation, for example, r(t) = 
®o "*• air(t-l) + a2r(t-2) + a^rft-S) + e(t), if we suspect that 
there is a single unit root with the other roots less than 1, then the 
above stochastic difference equation can be rewritten in the following 
form: r(t) = a^ + b^rft-l) + bgdelrCt-l) + bgdelrft-Z) where bj=a]^+a2+a2 
^The stability condition is simply that the absolute value of b^ 
be less than unity. 
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Table 4-2. Dickey-Fuller form of ARIMA estimates 
r(t) = Sq + b^r(t-l) + bgdelrft-l) + bgdelr(t-2) + e^Ct) 
a^ b]^ bg bg t-stat® R 
U.S. 0.0284 ^  
(0.0147)b 
0.9711 
(0.0146) 
0.0010 
(0.0748) 
0.1925 
(0.0747) 
-1.97 0.964 
Germany 0.0408 
(0.0204) 
0.9652 
(0.0171) 
0.2649 
(0.0734) 
-2.03 0.951 
Japan 0.0271 
(0.0207) 
0.9796 
(0.0157) 
0.2100 
(0.0754) 
-1.29 0.960 
Philippines 0.0496 
(0.0288) 
0.9652 
(0.0209) 
-1.66 0.926 
India 0.0327 
(0.0132) 
0.9619 
(0.0145) 
0.2620 
(0.0725) 
-2.61 0.963 
Thailand 0.0463 
(0.0218) 
0.9562 
(0.0198) 
-2.19 0.932 
*The t-statistic is for the hypothesis = 1, 
^The standard errors are in parentheses. 
Notice that these estimated parameters are in the stability set of 
the parameter space; the point estimate of the largest characteristic root 
always suggests convergence. However, by using the Dickey-Fuller confi­
dence intervals under the null of a single unit root, we cannot reject the 
null at the 10% significance level for all countries but India. Even 
though we could not accept the random walk hypothesis for the real 
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exchange rate for India, the point estimate for dominant root indicates 
that there is a great amount of persistence in any deviation from the 
PPP. 
SURE Estimates 
If we could not rule out any possible correlation in the error terms 
across equations, it is natural for us to consider Zellner's Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions (SURE) estimates of the real exchange rate. By 
doing this, we can improve the precision of our estimates. 
In performing the SURE estimations, the ARIMA representation for the 
real exchange rate was used: an AR(1) for the Philippines and Thailand 
an AR(2) for Germany, Japan, and India, and an AR(3) for the United 
States. The results are reported in Table 4-3; the column labeled 
't-statistic' indicates the t-value for b^ = 1. 
From Table 4-3,we can now reject the null of a unit root for the 
U.S. as well as for India. It is surprising that, other than for 
Thailand, the Japanese-Korean real exchange rate is the most likely to be 
nonstationary. 
Cointegration and Error Correction Models 
If two economic variables are nonstationary, it is still possible 
that a linear combination of the two is stationary. Following Granger 
and Engle (1984), we know that two time series--3(t)p*(t) and p(t)--are 
cointegrated of order (d, b) if: 
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Table 4-3. Unit root tests for SURE model 
r(t) = dg + b^rft-l) + bgdelrCt-l) + b3delr(t-2) 
January 1973- a^ b, b, b, t-statistic^ 
July 1987 u i c j 
U.S. 0.0364 L 
(0.0107)° 
0.9632 
(0.0106) 
0.1141 
(0.0517) 
0.0863 
(0.0502) 
-3.47 
Germany 0.0340 
(0.0151) 
0.9709 
(0.0125) 
0.2795 
(0.0526) 
-2.32 
Japan 0.0310 
(0.0163) 
0.9766 
(0.0123) 
0.2221 
(0.0576) 
-1.90 
Philippines 0.0523 
(0.0205) 
0.9633 
(0.0181) 
-2.02 
India 0.0308 
(0.0092) 
0.9641 
(0.0200) 
0.2636 -3.59 
Thailand 0.0151 
(0.0165) 
0.9848 
(0.0150) 
-1.01 
^The t-statistics are for the hypothesis b^ = 1. 
^The standard errors are in parentheses. 
1) e(t)p*(t) and p(t) are integrated of order d; thus, to have 
stationary stochastic processes, we have to difference both p(t) and 
e(t)p*(t) d times. 
2) there exists a scalar r (r % 0) so that the series e(t)p*(t) -
r p(t) is integrated of order d - b. 
Campbell and Shi Her (1987) argued that vector autoregressive 
representation is not appropriate in the presence of a cointegrating 
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vector; instead, an error-correction model is also recommended. As 
Granger and Engle (1984) show, if p(t) and e(t)p*(t) are integrated of 
order 1, then it is generally true that z(t) = e(t)p*(t) - s p(t) will 
also be 1(1). However, it is possible that d(t) = e(t)p*(t) - r p(t) 
is intergrated of order zero. 
By using this information, we can construct the error correcting 
model. A linear representation of the econometric model is as follows: 
(1) e(t)p*(t) - r p(t) = d(t) 
(5) e(t)p*(t) - s p(t) = z(t) 
Note that d(t) should be stationary because, by assumption, p(t) and 
e(t)p*(t) are cointegrated of order (1, 0); the residual of (1) is 
stationary without differencing. Note that this is an assumption implied 
by PPP; unless d(t) is stationary, long-run RPR cannot hold. On the 
other hand, z(t) is assumed to follow a random walk; if z(t) is 
stationary, prices and the exchange rate must be stationary. The 
stationarity of z(t) is violated by the observed movements in prices and 
the exchange rate. 
To formulate the error-correcting model, let the d(t) series exhibit 
first-order serial correlation. An AR representation for d(t) and a z(t) 
series could be written as: 
(6) d(t) - pd(t-l) = egft) 
(7) z(t) - z(t-l) = e^ft) 
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where e^tt) and e^ft) are uncorrelated white noise disturbances and 
0 < p < 1. 
Manipulating (1), (5), (6), and (7), we can derive the error 
correction representation.^ 
(8) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = -s(l-p)/(s-r) d(t-l) + s/(s-r) egft) 
-r/(s-r) egft) 
(9) (1-L) p(t) = -(l-p)/(s-r) d(t-l) + l/(s-r) egtt) -
l/(s-r) egft) 
Equations (8) and (9) show how exchange rates and/or prices 
[e(t)p*(t), p{t)] can be explained by the previous deviation—d(t-l)~ 
from equilibrium. Notice that the error-correction model would be 
appropriate if there is a cointegrating vector which makes the linear 
combination of economic variables stable. But we can not exclude the 
possibility of no cointegrating vector. 
^Equations (1) and (6) can be combined to obtain: (l-pL)e(t)p* 
= r(l-pL)p(t) + egtt), where L denotes the lag operator. We can 
obtain the following equation, (A), by adding and subtracting 
Le(t)p*(t) and r p(t-l). 
(A) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = r(l-L)p(t) + r(l-p)p(t-l) -
(l-p)e(t-l)p*(t-l) + egft) 
Equation (7) yields (B). 
(B) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = s(l-L)p(t) + e^ft) 
Solving (A) and (B) simultaneously yields (8) and (9). 
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Cointeqration Tests 
Engle and Granger (1987) argued that the estimated cointegrating 
vector is a consistent estimator in a large sample. Regressing e(t)p (t) 
on p(t), we obtain an estimate of r which is a consistent estimator 
provided that d(t) is stationary. In the same way, the regression of 
p(t) on e(t)p*(t) yields a consistent estimator of 1/r. 
To perform the cointegration tests, the residuals of this 
equilibrium regression should be checked for stationarity by using a 
Dickey-Fuller test; if p(t) and e(t)p*(t) are cointegrated, the 
residuals must be stationary. The 'equilibrium' relationship was 
estimated as follows: 
e(t)p*(t) = r p(t) + d(t). 
If d(t) is stationary, a finite AR representation for d(t) is 
possible. This AR representation for d(t) could well be rewritten for a 
Dickey-Fuller test. 
Specifically: (l-L) d(t) = e d(t-l) + E  (l-L) d(t-i) 
i=l 
A 
where the d(t) series is the estimated residual of (1). If the estimated 
residuals are stationary, the estimated value of 8 will be significantly 
different from zero. Cointegration test results are reported in Table 
4-4. 
Table 4-4 indicates that the cointegration tests fail for all 
nations except for the case of Thailand. All the t-statistics except for 
Thailand's are sufficiently small that we can not reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at a 10% significance level. 
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Table 4-4. Cointegration test 
January 1973-
July 1987 t-statistic^ 
No lagged changes; (l-L)d(T) = Sq + ed(t-l) 
United States -0.0105 L 
(0.0110)° 
0.9545 
Germany 0.0 
(0.0148) 
0.0 
Japan -0.005 
(0.0134) 
-0.073 
Philippines -0.0363 
(0.0216) 
-1.6805 
India -0.0425 
(0.0221) 
-1.92 
Thailand -0.0935 
(0.0325) 
-2.87 
4 
Four lags; (l-L)d(t) = a„ + 0d(t-l) + E 6,-(l-L)d(t-i) 
° 1=1 
United States -0.0135 -1.2053 
(0.0112) 
Germany 0.0031 0.2214 
(0.0140) 
Japan -0.0174 -1.2167 
(0.0143) 
Philippines -0.0344 -1.5288 
(0.0225) 
India -0.0578 -2.5575 
(0.0226) 
Thailand -0.0147 -4.05 
(0.0364) 
The t-statistic is for the hypothesis 8=0. To reject the null of 
no unit root, Dickey and Fuller show that the t-statistic should be 
greater than -2.58 (with 100 observation) at 10% significance level. 
'^The standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Notice, however, that cointegration tests for PPP between Korea and India 
are borderline insignificant at the 10% level. Given the point 
estimates, there is some evidence supportive of PPP; in general, however, 
it is hard to argue that long-run PPP holds for Korea. 
Error correcting model 
Given that the Thai and Korean price levels are cointegrated, it is 
possible to estimate the error-correcting model. Consider (10) and 
(11): 
(10) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = 0.0298 - 0.0712 Ce(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l)] 
(0.0093) (0.0364) 
(11) (l-L)p(t) = 0.0307 + 0.0227 Ce(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l)] 
(0.0050) (0.0194) 
where r is the estimate of the long-run real exchange rate obtained from 
the equilibrium regression. 
The Thailand price level multiplied by the won price of the baht 
declined in response to a positive deviation from PPP. The point 
estimate of the slope coefficient in (10) says that approximately 1% of 
the previous deviation from the equilibrium relationship was adjusted 
within one month. 
Note that the Korea price level does not seem to be responsive to 
deviations from previous equilibrium relationship with Thailand; the 
point estimate of the adjustment coefficient for the Korean price level 
64 
is well within a standard deviation from zero. This result would be 
expected if we consider that Thailand is the minor trade partner for 
Korea. 
Consider the error-correcting models for the Korea major trade 
partners, the U.S. and Japan. Even though they failed the formal test 
for cointegration, the error-correcting representations are Instructive. 
Consider the error-correcting model for the U.S.: 
(12) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = 0.0321 - 0.0498 Ce(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l) 
(0.0047) (0.0098) 
(13) (l-L)p(t) = 0.0303 - 0.0368 Ce(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l) 
(0.0048) (0.0100) 
In response to a positive deviation from PPP, the U.S. price level 
multiplied by the won price of the dollar decreased. The point estimate 
of the slope coefficient in (12) implies that about 5% of the previous 
deviation from the PPP was corrected within one month. 
The Korean price level actually declined in response to a positive 
deviation from the PPP; the point estimate of the adjustment coefficient 
for the Korean price level is significantly different from zero. 
Consider also the error-correcting model for Japan: 
(14) (1-L)e(t)p*(t) = 0.0533 - 0.0092 [e(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l)] 
(0.0143) (0.0130) 
(15) (l-L)p(t) = 0.0306 - 0.0065 [e(t-l)p*(t-l) - rp(t-l)] 
(0.0050) (0.0045) 
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Contrary to the U.S., Japan's price level multiplied by the won 
price of the yen was not responsive to a positive deviation from the PPP. 
The point estimate of the slope coefficient in (14) is well within a 
standard deviation from zero. 
Moreover, the Korean price level did not appear to be responsive to 
deviations from the real exchange rate movement, the point estimate of 
the adjustment coefficient for the Korean price level is well within a 
standard deviation from zero. 
To see the adjustment between the exchange rate and the PPP in a 
different way, we have repeated the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure by 
using the foreign price level and the Korean price level divided by the 
won price of the foreign exchange. 
The estimated error-correcting models for Thailand are: 
(16) (1-L)p*(t) = 0.0120 + 0.0220 [p(t-l)/e(t-l) - (1/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0020) (0.0157) 
(17) (l-L)p(t)/e(t) = 0.0126 - 0.0728 Cp(t-l)/e(t-l) - (l/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0041) (0.0323) 
The point estimate of the slope coefficient for (16) shows that 
Thailand's price level did not seem to be responsive to a positive 
deviation from the previous equilibrium regression; the point estimate of 
the adjustment coefficient for the Thailand price level is well within a 
standard deviation from zero. 
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On the other hand, the Korean price level divided by the won price of 
the baht eliminated almost 7% of the deviation within one month. 
The estimated error-correcting models for the U.S. are: 
(18) (1-L)p*(t) = 0.0095 + 0.0226 [p(t-l)/e(t-l) - (l/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0010) (0.0048) 
(19) (l-L)p(t)/e(t) = 0.0090 + 0.0057 [p(t-l)/e(t-l) - (l/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0030) (0.0137) 
The U.S. price level was adjusted to eliminate almost 2% of the 
deviation from PPP. On the contrary, the slope coefficient of (19) 
implies that the Korean price level divided by the won price of the dollar 
was not corrected to eliminate the previous deviation from the PPP. 
The estimated error-correcting models for Japan are: 
(20) (1-L)p*(t) = 0.0042 + 0.0325 Cp(t-l)/e(t-l) - (l/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0012) (0.0075) 
(21) (l-L)p(t)/e(t) = 0.0013 + 0.0095 Cp(t-l)/e(t-l) - (l/r)p*(t-l)] 
(0.0038) (0.9234) 
Surprisingly, we have gotten the same result with the U.S. The 
Japanese price level moved in the correct direction in response to the 
previous deviation from PPP. The price level divided by the won price of 
the yen did not appear to adjust to a positive deviation from the 
equilibrium relationship. 
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Conclusions 
Point estimates of ARIMA models of the real exchange rate for Korea 
and her major trading partners indicate convergence; this result is in 
accord with long-run PPP. However, by using Dickey-Fuller tests, we could 
not reject the null hypothesis of a single unit root for any nation except 
India. SURE estimates indicated that both the U.S. and Indian real 
exchange rates were convergent. 
Engle and Granger (1987) argued that if there is an equilibrium 
relationship between economic variables, these time series might be 
cointegrated with each other. Cointegration tests for all nations but 
Thailand failed to indicate PPP. The overall impression is that 
PPP cannot be said to hold for the Korean economy. 
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CHAPTER V. VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIVE (VAR) REPRESENTATION 
ANALYSIS OF PPP IN THE KOREAN ECONOMY 
In Chapter IV, we have seen that there is mixed evidence supporting 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). SURE estimations indicate that PPP 
"works" for U.S. vs. Korea but not for Japan vs. Korea. However, 
cointegration tests show that PPP fails for all three nations. The 
overall implication of Chapter IV is that PPP does not hold for the 
Korean economy. 
In this chapter, we want to analyze why there are deviations from 
PPP. The theory of PPP states that 1) monetary shocks of any variety 
should not induce permanent deviations from PPP and 2) the relative 
productivity shocks may induce permanent deviations from PPP. To test 
this proposition, we focus on the Japanese/Korean and the U.S./Korean 
real exchange rates within a vector autoregression (VAR) framework. The 
critical point of the VAR method is that we do not have to distinguish 
endogenous variables from exogenous variables. 
Data for the U.S., Korean, and Japanese industrial production 
indexes, money supplies (Ml), prices (wholesale price index),^ exchange 
rates, and interest rates have been collected from International 
Financial Statistics. 
^Only consumer and wholesale price indices are available on a 
monthly basis for all nations in the study. Wholesale price indices are 
generally thought to be more appropriate for constructing real exchange 
rates than are consumer prices. Note that export (or import) unit values 
are preferred for analyzing a nation's terms of trade. 
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Model Selection 
The Choice of Variables in VAR 
Traditional macro-econometric method has imposed priori restrictions 
on the relationships between economic variables (Sims, 1980a, b). To 
avoid this identification problem Sims has proposed to use VAR methodology 
alternatively. Furthermore, he has shown that different identification in 
the VAR system yields the different types of impulse responses which 
indicates the different policy implications (Sims, 1987). 
Even though VAR analysis does not place any restriction on the 
relationships between economic variables, the VAR system has two 
limitations: the choice of variables and the number of lags. 
The choice of variables was dictated by the PPP theory. Note that 
economic theory is a very useful guide for the choice of variables, in 
spite of the fact that VAR technique does not depend on a particular model 
specification suggested by the theory. The PPP theory states that 1) 
monetary shocks of any variety do matter in the short-run deviations from 
PPP and 2) the relative productivity shocks may induce the permanent 
deviation from PPP. 
The theory of PPP implies that we may consider three variables in the 
VAR system; that is, the bilateral real exchange rate (ep*/p), the 
relative money supply ratio between two countries, and the relative 
productivity shocks between two countries. 
The validity of using the bilateral real exchange rate in the VAR 
system is that the PPP disparity implies the nonstationarity of the real 
exchange rate. 
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In addition to the three variables suggested by PPP, interest rate is 
included in the VAR system temporarily because the VAR system is so 
sensitive to omitted variables and interest rate may be important in the 
movement of the real exchange rate.^ 
To set the variables in the VAR system, the block causality test has 
been employed to validate three variables in the VAR system: real 
exchange rate, money supply ratio, and industrial production index 
ratio.3 
The economic variables that form the VAR system are as follows: 
Notation: 
R(t) = e(t)p*(t)/p(t); e(t); nominal exchange rate 
p*(t); foreign price level 
p(t); domestic price level 
R(t); bilateral real exchange rate 
delr(t) = R(t) - R(t-l) 
m(t) = M*(t)/M(t); m(t); relative money supply ratio 
M*(t); foreign money supply 
M(t); domestic money supply 
^Sims (1972) argued that the causality runs from money to income. 
That is, the money stock is causally prior, in Granger's sense. In the 
presence of the interest rate in the VAR system, the above argument would 
not be true. Along this line of argument, see Sims (1980a, b). 
^Theory suggests that the real exchange rate can be affected by 
real government purchases and (in a non-Ricardian Equivalence environment) 
taxes. Unfortunately, the use of monthly data precludes us from obtaining 
good measures of government spending or taxes. For the same reason, the 
Index of Industrial Production—rather than Gross National Product—was 
used to measure "output." 
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delm(t) = CM*(t)/M(t) - M*(t-1)/M(t-1)] 
y(t) = Y(t)/Y(t); Y*(t); foreign industrial production index 
Y(t); domestic industrial production index 
dely(t) = [Y*(t)/Y(t) - Y*(t-1)/Y(t-1)] 
ipc(t) = i(t) - i*(t) - Ce(t+1) - e(t)]/e(t); 
i*(t); foreign interest rate 
i(t); domestic interest rate 
delipc(t) = ipc(t) - ipc(t-l). 
The VAR system we may consider is as follows: 
aii(l) ^14(1) delm(t) e^(t) 
agid) aggfl) aggd) ag^CD dely(t) egft) 
*3l(l) &32(T) *33(1) ^24(1) delr(t) e3(t) 
&4l(1) 842(1) 843(1) 844(1) delipc(t) e4(t) 
where: a^j = polinomials in the lag operator 1; and ej^ = white noise 
stochastic disturbancs (k = 1, 2, 3, 4). 
The above VAR system contains 4 variables: the relative money 
supply ratio differential, the relative productivity ratio differential, 
the real exchange rate differential, and the interest rate differential. 
(Using the interest rate parity condition, we have defined the interest 
rate differential.^) By taking the first order differencing of the 
^We used several formulations for the interest rate differential. 
Let i(t) and i*(t) represent the Korean and foreign short-term rate, 
respectively. The specifications: i(t)-i*(t); i(t)-i*(t)+Ce(t+l)/e(t) 
-1]; and i(t)-i*(t)+[e(t+l)/e(t)-l] were used as measures of the interest 
rate differential for both the U.S./Korean and Japanese/Korean cases. 
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variables, we can keep the assumption that the arguments of the VAR 
system are wide-sense stationary. 
All series are monthly and cover the period of January 1973 to July 
1987. The system also contains a constant and 11 seasonal dummy 
variables. 
The block causality test was done to select the appropriate 
variables in VAR. The Granger-Sims causality test is multivariate-
generalized in this test. The null hypothesis for doing this test is 
that, in the set of variables delm, dely, delr, delipc, lags of delipc do 
not affect the first three. Two systems for delm, dely, and delr are 
estimated. The restricted one excludes the lags of delipc, while the 
unrestricted one includes them. 
Consider the U.S. vs. Korean VAR system. Twelve lags were specified 
for this system—a constant and 11 seasonal dummies were included in the 
system. A statistical test was performed to see the block exogeneity. 
The chi-square, x^(df = 36) = 27.77 with 36 restrictions, indicated 
that the null hypothesis could not be rejected at a high significance 
level (83%). 
The implication of this test result is that the joint movements of 
the real exchange rate, the relative productivity shock, and the relative 
money supply shock are independent of the interest rate shock. This 
result allows us to set three variables (delm, dely, and delr) in the 
U.S. vs. Korea VAR system. 
We have also considered the Japan vs. Korea system—12 lags were 
specified and a constant with 11 seasonal dummies was included in the VAR 
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system. A block exogeneity test was done for this system. The 
chi-square, x^(df = 36) = 31.84 with 36 restrictions, indicated that 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected at a high significance level 
(66%). This result convinced us to set 3 variables (delm, dely, and 
delr) in the Japan vs. Korea VAR system. 
As the theory suggested, we will consider 3 variables in two VAR 
systems (U.S. vs. Korea and Japan vs. Korea). 
The choice of lags in VAR 
We are now left with the choice of lag length. The testing 
procedure in choosing the appropriate lag length is the likelihood ratio: 
(t-c) [log det E - log det Z ], where 2 and Z are the restricted 
K U K U 
and unrestricted covariance matrices, and t is the number of observations. 
Following Sims (1980a, b), we have considered correcting c to 
improve the small sample properties. This concept was applied to the 
block causality test in the previous section. 
Consider the U.S. vs. Korea VAR system with 3 variables. We have 
also considered a constant and 11 seasonal dummies as explanatory 
variables in the system. 
A statistical test was done to choose the lag length in the VAR 
system. Twelve lag length specifications against 18 lag length 
specifications were tested by using the Sims modified likelihood ratio 
test. The chi-square, x2(df =54) = 31.74 with 54 restrictions 
indicated that the 12 lags specification could not be rejected at a high 
significance level (99%). 
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To confirm that the 12 lags specification is compatible with the 
U.S. vs. Korea system, we have done the statistical lag length test 
again. That is, the 6 lag-length specification was tested against the 12 
lag-length specification. The chi-square, x^fdf =54) = 111.82, 
indicated that the 6 lags specification could be rejected at a 5% 
significance level. 
The statistical lag length tests imply that the 12 lags 
specification is appropriate in the U.S. vs. Korea system. 
For the Japan vs. Korea case we have performed a statistical lag 
length test again. First, a 12 lags specification test was done against 
an 18 lags specification. The chi-square, x^(df = 54) = 40.70 with 54 
restrictions, showed that the 12 lag-length specification could not be 
rejected at a high significance level (90%). Once more, the 6 lag-length 
specification test against a 12 lag-length was performed. The resulting 
chi-square, x^(df =54) = 106.72 with 54 restrictions, showed that the 6 
lag-length specification could be rejected at a 5% significance level. 
The lag-length test for both systems (U.S. vs. Korea and Japan vs. 
Korea) showed that the 12 lags specification is appropriate for both VAR 
systems. 
Estimated VAR 
In the previous section,we have set the three variables for both 
systems with 12 lags: a constant and 11 seasonal dummies are included as 
explanatory variables in both systems. The estimated VAR (U.S. vs. 
Korea) is reported in Table 5-1. 
Table 5-1. Estimated vector autoregression (U.S. vs. Korea) 
Equation Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
delm delm -0.181^ -0.041 -0.061 0.057 -0.106* 0.089 0.063 0.059* -0.127* 
dely -0.172* -0.152* -0.206* -0.074 0.101 0.070 0.3lb 0.180* -0.085 
delr -0.074* -0.147b -0.055 -0.076* 0.038 -0.019b 0.062 -0.069 0.029 
seasonals -0.015b 0.013b o.oieb 0.002 0.001 0.005* 0.0 -0.020b 0.012b 
del g delm -0.081* 0.076* 0.051* 0.17b 0.212b 0.062 -0.049 -0.035 -0.151b 
dely -0.194b 0.083 0.060 -0.034 -0.051 0.083* 0.023 0.167b 0.067 
delr -0.069* 0.028 -0.031 -0.057* 0.040 -0.132b -0.033 0.035 -0.074* 
seasonals 0.001^  -0.007* 0.001 0.003 -0.006* 0.002 -0.003 -O.Ollb 0.0 
delr delm 0.11 0.07 0.032 0.090 0.245b 0.005 0.030 0.185* -0.075 
delr 0.114 0.143 0.001 0.223* -0.026 0.138 0.211* -0.047b -0.040b 
delr -0.039 0.057 0.046 0.042 0.009 0.132* 0.170* -0.062 0.106* 
seasonals 0.0 0.006 0
 
0
 
00
 
0.006 0.001* 0.005 -0.008* -0.003 0.007* 
Note: The sample period is 1974:2 to 1987:7 (162 observations), a indicates a t-statistic 
between 1 and 2 in absolute value, b Indicates a t-statistic greater than 2. The lags in 
seasonals, especially, are in the order of -11 to 0 instead of 1 to 12. 
Table 5-1. (Continued) 
Equation Variable 10 11 12 Durbin-Watson R2 SE(XIO) 
delm delm -0.001 -0.079 0.002 2.12 0.697 0.12 
dely 0.180* 0.297b 0.200* 
delr 0.040 0.082 0.151^  
seasonals -0.01^  -0.016^  0.007* 
del g delm 0.018 0.089* 0.028 2.11 0.569 0.085 
dely 0.157b 0.146* -0.263b 
delr 0.146^  0.122^  0.055* 
seasonals 0.0 -0.002 0.009b 
delr delm 
-0.173* -0.315b -0.060 1.97 0.413 0.15 
delr -0.022 0.015 -0.117 
delr -0.120* -0.151* -0.163* 
seasonals -0.003 
0
 
0
 0.013b 
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A three-equation system was estimated by using OLS, equation by 
equation. The volatility of the relative money supply ratio, as measured 
by the etimated standard error, is higher than that of the relative 
productivity ratio. The real exchange rate shows the highest volatility 
among the 3 variables. 
Most of the parameters in autoregressive system are not significant, 
as we would expect from an over-parameterized model. The estimated 
coefficients on successive lags tend to oscillate in each system. 
Because of both the near multicollinearity in each equation and the 
complicated cross-equation feedbacks, the autoregressive coefficients are 
very difficult to interpret. The vector-moving, average representation, 
which is more comprehensible and equivalent to VAR, will be considered in 
the following section. As will be seen in the next section, in contrast 
to the VAR system, the responses to typical random shocks are relatively 
smooth; we can elicit a reasonable economic interpretation. 
The dynamic interrelationships among the variables are specified in 
Table 5-2. 
In equation delm (the U.S. vs. Korea relative money supply ratio), 
given delr and dely, all of the own lags of a delm are not important in 
explaining the movement of a delm at a 5% significance level. On the 
other hand, given delm and delr, the zero coefficients of all lags in 
dely can not be rejected at a S% significance level, which implies that 
past values of relative productivity shock do matter in the movement of 
the relative money supply ratio in the presence of the past own lags of 
the relative money supply ratio and the past lags of the real exchange 
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Table 5-2. F-statistics for tests in which all lags of designated 
variables have zero coefficients (U.S. vs. Korea) 
Equation 
Variable 
delm dely delr 
delm 1.8213a 2.34 1.98 
(0.053) (0.01) (0.03) 
dely 2.67 3.477 2.875 
(0.003) (0.0002) (0.0016) 
delr 1.63 0.76 1.787 
(0.09) (0.69) (0.058) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate approximate marginal significance 
levels. 
rate. Given delm and dely, the stochastic process of the relative money 
supply ratio could be affected by the real exchange rate movement at a 5% 
significance level. 
In equation dely, all of the lagged variables are important in the 
movement of the relative productivity shock at a 5% significance level. ' 
In equation of delr, a 5% significance level, no variable matters in the 
movement of the real exchange, given the other two variables. But at a 
10% significance level, given dely and delr, the lagged values of the 
relative money supply ratio could affect the real exchange rate deviation 
from its long-run level. In this sense, any variety of the relative 
money supply shock does matter in the real exchange nonstationarity. As 
we have come to expect, the real exchange rate movement is affected by 
its own lags. 
79 
Note that this kind of statistical causal relationship can be 
misleading since OLS results are fairly robust in the VAR. To capture 
the refined causal relationships between variables, impulse responses and 
error decomposition will be introduced in section 3. 
We are now in a position to consider the Japan vs. Korea VAR system. 
Table 5-3 shows the estimated VAR system (Japan vs. Korea). 
Like the U.S. vs. Korea VAR system, the estimated VAR (Japan vs. 
Korea) indicates that the estimated coefficients on successive lags are 
oscilated in each OLS equation. The highest volatility, as indicated by 
estimated standard error in each equation, is with the real exchange 
rate. The variability in relative monetary shocks is more than that of 
relative productivity shocks. These observations have the same 
conclusions with the U.S. vs. Korea VAR system. 
Granger causality tests have been performed in the Japan vs. Korea 
VAR system. It is striking that movements in the money supply and the 
real exchange rate appear to be completely autonomous; movements in these 
variables are not even explained by their own past as shown in Table 5-4. 
In equation delm, given 2 variables, no variable explains the 
movement in the relative money supply ratio. Strikingly, the lagged 
values of the relative money supply shock do not cause the movement of 
themselves in the presence of lagged real exchange rate and lagged 
productivity shock. 
In equation dely, given dely and delr, the relative money supply 
shock is very important in the stochastic process of relative 
productivity shock at a 5% significance level. Unlike the relative money 
Table 5-3. Estimated vector autoregression (Japan vs. Korea) 
Equation Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
delm delm -0.055b 0.038 -0.120* 0.007 -0.095* 0.110* -0.142 -0.004 -0.120* 
del g -0.441^ -0.137 -0.05 -0.046 0.289* 0.013 0.221* 0.054 •'-0.120 
delr 0.038 -0.016^ -0.001 -0.087* 0.017 0.015 0.003 0.038 0.003 
seasonals -0.004 0.027b -0.001* 0.001 -0.004 -0.01* -0.008* -0.021b -0.001* 
del g delm -0.029 0.061* 0.018 0.076^ 0.127b 0.047* -0.090^ -0.033 -0.105b 
del g -0.093* 0.093* 0.079 0.086* -0.104* 0.127* 0.184b 0.285b 0.112* 
delr -0.02 -0.05* 0.026* -0.042* 0.358* -0.004 -0.05b 0.068b -0.047* 
seasonals -0.002 0.0 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006* -0.048* 0.002 
delr delm 0.008 -0.055 0.72 0.060 -0.22* -0.117 0.114 0.181* 0.067 
dely -0.013 0.035 -0.470* 0.050 0.226 0.282* 0.145 -0.592* 0.254 
delr 0.202^ -0.09 0.116* 0.106* 0.046 0.0 -0.042 0.013 -0.007 
seasonals -0.004 0.012 0.009 0.010 -0.014* -0.008 0.011 0.009 0.013* 
Note: The sample period is 1974:2 to 1987:7 (162 observations), a indicates a t-statistic 
between 1 and 2 in absolute value, b indicates a t-statistic greater than 2. The lags in 
seasonals, especially, are in the order of -11 to 0 instead of 1 to 12. 
Table 5-3. (Continued) 
Equation Variable 10 11 12 Durbin-Watson SE(XIO) 
delm delm -0.077 0.051 0.227b 2.10 0.597 0.191 
de] g 0.157 0.266* 0.074 
delr 0.028 -0.002 0.135b 
seasonal s -0.006 -0.002 -0.015* 
del g delm -0.025 0.033 -0.037 2.10 0.60 0.081 
del g 0.1* 0.157b -0.238^ 
delr 0.019 0.004 0.007b 
seasonal s -0.001 0.008^ 0.007 
delr delm -0.010 -0.220* -0.009 1.957 0.3 0.303 
dely 0.238 0.482 -0.016 
delr 
seasonal s 
-0.149* 
-0.011 
0.044 
-0.003 
-0.002 
0.011 
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Table 5-4. F-statistics for tests in which all lags of the designated 
variable have zero coefficients (Japan vs. Korea) 
Equation 
Variable 
delm dely delr 
delm 1.494 a 1.140 0.924 
(0.136) (0.335) (0.526) 
dely 3.543 5.59 1.84 
(0.0002) (0.0) (0.05) 
delr 0.800 1.02 1.03 
(0.64) (0.44) (0.43) 
^Numbers in parentheses indicate approximate marginal significance 
levels. 
supply ratio, in the presence of delm and delr, the own lagged values of 
relative productivity shock explain the movement of themselves at a 5% 
significance level. Given delm and dely, real exchange rate shock does 
matter in the movement of the relative productivity shock at a 10% 
significance level. 
In equation delr, surprisingly, given two variables, no variable 
causes the real exchange rate deviation from its long-run level. This 
Granger test suggests that there may be a third factor that influences 
the movement of the real exchange rate. 
Unlike the U.S. vs. Korea system, we can not find any factor to 
influence the movement of real exchange rate at even a 10% significance 
level. Note that for the U.S. vs. Korea system, money does matter for 
the nonstationarity of the real exchange rate at a 10% significance level. 
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The System's Response to Typical Random Shocks — 
(Impulse Responses and Variance Decomposition) 
The impulse response function, or moving average representation, is 
suggested as an alternative descriptive device of the VAR system^ 
because autoregressive systems are very difficult to describe succinctly; 
there are complex patterns of cross-equation feedbacks. Furthermore, the 
estimated lagged coefficients tend to oscillate. In contrast to the VAR 
estimation, the impulse response function may yield the reasonable 
economic interpretation. 
Given the VAR system, the typical random shocks are positive 
residuals of one standard deviation unit in each equation.® For 
example, the residual in the money supply ratio (M*/M) is referred to 
^By Wold's decomposition theorem, a finite stationary 
autoregressive representation can be inverted to an infinite moving 
average representation. This result can be extended to a multivariate 
autoregressive representation. For more details, see Fuller (1976). 
®Given a finite order vector autoregressive representation, 
a(l)y(t) = u(t), where y(t) is an n x 1 vector, a(l) is an n x n matrix 
of polynomials in the backward-shift operator, 1, i.e., a(l) = ag -
ail - a, - ... - arl^, and u(t) is an (n x 1) vector of random distur-i a g 
bances, each of which is independent and identically distributed with 
zero mean and finite variance, but they are contemporaneously correlated. 
By the Wold decomposition theorem, moving average representation, y(t) = 
Z G(s)u(t-s) where G(s) is an (n x n) matrix of parameters. Then, y(t) 
s=0 00 
can be written as y(t) = 2 G(s)T"nu(t-s), where T is a matrix to the 
s=0 
variance-covariance matrix of e(t) = Tu(t), the identity matrix. The 
i, component, c^j(s), of G(s)T"^ is response of y^ to an innovation or 
exogenous shock of one standard deviation in y^. Sims (1980a, b) argued 
that e(t) is the driving force in the system. 
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as the money supply ratio innovation in the sense that it can not be 
predicted from past values of variables in the system. 
Note that the residuals (residual vector) in the VAR system are 
contemporaneously correlated across equations and that they are 
uncorrected with the past residuals. To capture the distinct pattern of 
movement of the variables in the system, the orthogonalization of 
disturbances in the system may be useful. But, unfortunately, there is 
no unique, best way for doing this.^ 
To do this orthogonalization, we have triangularized the system, 
with variables ordered as (M*/M), (Y*/Y), (ep*/p).® With this 
triangularization, (M*/M) innovation is assumed to disturb all the 
other variables of the system instantly, to the extent of the strength of 
the contemporaneous correlation of other residuals with the (M*/M). In 
the same way, the innovation in (Y*/Y) is assumed to disturb only the 
real exchange rate, while the (ep*/p) residual is only allowed to 
affect the variable (ep*/p) in the initial period. Notice that this 
ordering makes it most likely that real and nominal variables will affect 
the real exchange rate. Reversing the ordering of money and productivity 
does not affect the results reported below. 
7 w 
Given moving average representation, y(t) = E G(s)T TU(t-s), 
s=0 
the matrix T is not a unique one for orthogonalization. 
®The ordering of the variables is based on the theory: Money is 
causally prior to income, money causes the real exchange rate in the 
short run and permanent real shock causes the permanent deviations from 
PPP. Furthermore, we have done the possible reordering of the variables, 
but it turned out that there is no significant change in statistical sense. 
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The charts at the end of this chapter display the impulse responses 
to a typical random shock in the system (see Figures 5-1 through 5-24).^ 
For the U.S. vs. Korea case, the interpretation of the system's 
response to typical random shock is as follows. U.S. money innovations 
have different effects on the money supply ratio, the productivity ratio, 
and the real exchange rate (see Figures 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6). The relative 
money supply ratio (M*/M) shows small fluctuations, returning to normal 
•after one year. The shape of the responses of the relative productivity 
ratio is different from that of the relative money supply ratio. The 
productivity ratio (Y*/Y) is higher than the normal for eight months, 
except for the second month after a shock occurs in U.S. money supply. 
The overall effect of U.S. money innovation has a positive effect on U.S. 
productivity, except for the period from eighth to eleventh month. This 
effect is consistent with the view that money affects income in the 
short-run. The real exchange rate (ep*/p) is higher than the normal 
level during the nine months after a shock in U.S. money supply. This 
result is contrary to the macroeconomic approach to the exchange rate 
determination. According to the macroeconomic view, with sticky prices, 
monetary expansion in the U.S. should induce the decrease in the won 
price of the dollar, which results in the reduction in eP*. That is, 
U.S. monetary shock may make a U.S. good competitive over a Korean good. 
But, the impulse response of the real exchange rate to a shock in money 
indicates that U.S. monetary innovation may cause the competitiveness of 
®The vertical axis of Figures 5-1 through 5-24 represents the 
fractions of standard deviations. 
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U.S. goods to deteriorate relative to Korean goods. The implication of 
this result is that there would be exchange rate stabilization in Korea. 
Even though responses of the real exchange rate to typical random shocks 
in U.S. money attains a negative peak after one year, it dampens out 
after that period. The real exchange rate deviation from its long-run 
level is persistent during ten months after a shock in U.S. money. 
The shock in U.S. productivity causes the big fluctuations in both 
the real exchange rate and the relative money supply ratio (see Figures 
5-7 and 5-9), while it causes the relatively smooth fluctuation in the 
relative productivity ratio (see Figure 5-8). For the first 5 months, 
there is a relative monetary contraction in the U.S. to one standard 
deviation shock in U.S. productivity, while U.S. monetary expansion 
occurs after this period for about 4 months. After one year, the impulse 
responses of the money supply ratio converge to the normal level. The 
overall effect of the U.S. productivity shock on the relative 
productivity ratio is positive, as we predicted. Contrary to the 
monetary shock to a real exchange rate movement, the responses of the 
real exchange rate to a shock in U.S. productivity shows the complex 
patterns during the first ten months. After this period, the real 
exchange rate is higher than the normal level for about six months, 
eventually dampening out to the normal level. This fact may illustrate 
the importance of the real factor in explaining the real exchange 
movement. This is consistent with Hsieh's view for the real exchange 
determination within the Ricardian framework. 
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The impulse response of the real exchange rate, the relative money 
supply ratio, and the relative productivity ratio to a random shock in 
the real exchange rate movement are as follows (see Figures 5-10, 5-11, 
and 5-12). 
The responses of the relative money supply ratio shows the mirror 
images in its fluctuations during the one and one-half year. During the 
first six months, there is a U.S. monetary contraction. This contraction 
is compatible with the response of the real exchange rate to a shock in 
U.S. money. Note that U.S. monetary innovation causes the real exchange 
rate to rise, which implies that the U.S. loses the competitiveness over 
Korea. So, it is natural for U.S. to reduce money supply in the presence 
of the rise in the real exchange rate. By doing that, the U.S. good can 
retain its competitiveness over the Korean good. 
The shock in the real exchange rate has a complicated effect on the 
income level, returning to the normal level after one year. 
Surprisingly, it has a positive peak effect on the income level at one 
year, while it has a negative peak effect at the seventh month. For the 
ten months, except the third and sixth months, after a shock, the 
positive real exchange rate shock has reduced the income level. The 
economic interpretation of this result is that the rise in the real 
exchange causes U.S. competitiveness over Korea to deteriorate, which 
results in the reduction of the U.S. income relative to Korean income. 
The real exchange rate movement to its own shock exhibits relative 
smoothness from the second month to the sixth month. After this period, 
f 
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the movement shows large fluctuations until one year. Eventually, it 
returns to the normal level. 
Consider the Japanese vs. Korean impulse responses to typical random 
shocks. Contrary to the case of the U.S. vs. Korea system, the response 
of the bilateral real exchange rate movement to a random shock in Japanese 
money supply is negative for the first four months, while both the move­
ment of the relative money supply ratio and that of the relative produc­
tivity ratio move in almost the same direction with that of the U.S. vs. 
Korea system (see Figures 5-16, 5-17 and 5-18). The real exchange rate 
movement for the first four months is in accord with the macroeconomic 
view with sticky prices. The macroeconomic approach to exchange rate 
determination states that a money supply increase in Japan reduces the own 
price of the yen. If price is sticky in the Japanese economy relative to 
the exchange rate, then ep* (foreign price level in terms of domestic 
currency unit) will decrease. If we interpret the real exchange rate as 
the terms of trade, then the lower level of the real exchange rate makes 
the Japanese economy more competitive than the Korean economy. The 
convergence pattern of the Japan vs. Korea real exchange rate is more 
complicated than that of the U.S. vs. Korea real exchange rate. Even 
though the real exchange rate (Japan vs. Korea) converges to its normal 
level, it fluctuates more than that of the U.S. vs. Korea real exchange 
rate. 
The adjustment pattern of 3 variables (real exchange rate, money 
supply ratio, and productivity ratio) to a random shock in Japanese 
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productivity is strikingly different from the U.S. vs. Korea system (see 
Figures 5-19, 5-20, and 5-21). 
As was seen in the U.S. vs. Korea system, for the first five months, 
the relative monetary contraction in Japan may be induced by the relative 
productivity shock in Japan. The response of the relative money supply in 
Japan has almost the same shape as that in the U.S. The relative income 
adjustment pattern in Japan to its own shock is more persistent than that 
of the U.S. vs. Korea system. But the pattern returns to its normal level 
Unlike the U.S. vs. Korea system, the real exchange rate is not 
sensitive to the positive productivity shock in Japan for the first three 
months. The overall effect of the relative productivity shock on the real 
exchange rate is positive, which implies that the relative productivity 
shock may cause the real exchange rate to rise. Thus, the relative 
productivity shock in Japan may make the Japanese economy less 
competitive. It is economically nonsensical. My own guess is that the 
productivity shock may induce the relative monetary fluctuation, which is 
transferred to the real exchange rate movement. 
The one standard deviation shock in the real exchange rate gives rise 
to the different shape of the impulse responses from the U.S. vs. Korea 
system (see Figures 5-22, 5-23, and 5-24). Unlike the U.S. vs. Korea 
system, the relative Japanese monetary contraction occurs because of the 
shock in the real exchange rate after three months. After six months, the 
impulse responses of the relative money supply ratio have the same pattern 
as that of the U.S. vs. Korea system. The dampening speed of the real 
exchange rate is more speedy than that of the U.S. vs. Korea system. For 
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the first seven months, except for the third month after a shock in the 
real exchange rate, the movement of the real exchange rate is above the 
normal level. It converges to its normal level from below the normal. 
The relative income in Japan is so sensitive to the random shock in 
the real exchange rate that it fluctuates more than that of the U.S. vs. 
Korea case. It may reflect the different Japanese economic philosophy 
from that of the United States. The real exchange rate movement to its 
own shock shows a different pattern to that, of the U.S. vs. Japan system. 
In the Japan vs. Korea system, the real exchange rate movement converges 
to its normal level from below the normal level, while the U.S. vs. Korea 
real exchange rate converges to its normal level from above the normal 
level. 
To locate the main channels of influence in the system, the 
decomposition of the variance of the variable has been executed. 
Table 5-5 represents the variance decomposition of the variables for the 
U.S. vs. Korea system. 
If a variable's own innovations account for all of its variance, we 
say this variable is an exogenous stochastic variable. In a dynamic 
macro-economic model, there is an intrinsic sampling error in estimates 
of the model. Taking into account this sampling error, a variable that 
^^Given y(t) = z C_e(t-s), where C(s) = G(s)T"^ and e(t) = Tu(t). 
s=0 ^ 
For linear model, the coefficients in C are interpreted as responses 
to innovation. The variance-covariance matrix of y(t) - ECy(t)| y(t-k), 
y(t-k-l), ... 3, the k period-ahead forecast of y is given by 
V. = Z k-1 c(s)var(e(t))C(s)'. 
s=0 
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Table 5-5. Variance decomposition: Proportions of forecast error k 
months ahead produced by each innovation (U.S. vs. Korea) 
Triangular innovation in 
Forecast error in K S.E. delm dely delr 
delm 1 0.0101 1.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.0105 0.95 0.02 0.03 
6 0.0109 0.93 0.03 0.04 
9 0.0114 0.87 0.06 0.07 
12 0.0121 0.84 0.09 0.07 
36 0.0127 0.81 0.1 0.09 
dely 1 0.0071 0.04 0.96 0.00 
3 0.0076 0.08 0.90 0.02 
6 0.0079 0.14 0.83 0.03 
9 0.0085 0.14 0.75 0.11 
12 0.0094 0.20 0.64 0.18 
36 0.0098 0.20 0.62 0.18 
delr 1 0.0127 0.01 0.01 0.99 
3 0.0128 0.01 0.01 0.98 
6 0.0132 0.02 0.02 0.93 
9 0.0138 0.03 0.03 0.90 
12 0.0145 0.03 0.03 0.85 
36 0.0150 0.13 0.05 0.82 
was strictly exogenous would have entries of almost 1.00 in its diagonal 
cell in the table, with almost all zeros in all other cells in its row of 
the table. 
For the U.S. vs. Korea system, both the money supply ratio and the 
real exchange rate have more than 80% of their variance accounted for by 
own innovations at all the time horizons shown. 
On the contrary, the variance of the relative productivity ratio is 
caused by its own innovation of about 60%. This result implies that the 
movements of the relative money supply ratio and the real exchange rate 
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are caused by their own innovations, respectively; that is, they are an 
exogenous stochastic process, compared to the relative productivity ratio. 
The innovation in the real exchange rate accounts for the variance of 
the relative money supply ratio by 9% at all time horizons, which 
indicates that there is a small feedback from the real exchange rate to 
the relative money supply ratio. 
The relative productivity ratio has about 20%, and 18% of its 
variance accounted for by the relative monetary innovations and the real 
exchange rate shock, respectively. This result is suggestive of important 
feedbacks from money and the real exchange rate into production. 
The real exchange rate movement is caused by the relative monetary 
shock of about 13%, while the relative productivity shock explains the 
variance of the real exchange by 5% at all time horizons. This is 
compatible with the previous result. Given the relative productivity 
ratio and the real exchange rate, monetary shock does matter in the real 
exchange rate nonstationarity at a 10% significance level. 
Table 5-6 shows the variance decomposition of the variable for the 
Japan vs. Korea system. 
Both the relative money supply ratio and the real exchange rate have 
more than 88% of their respective variance accounted for by their own 
innovation at all time horizons shown. The degree of the exogeneity of 
both has been strengthened, compared to the U.S. vs. Korea system. 
The innovation in the relative money supply in Japan explains the 
variance of the relative productivity ratio by 24%, and the real exchange 
rate shock caused the variability of the relative productivity by 11%. 
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Table 5-6. Variance decomposition: Proportions of forecast error k 
months ahead produced by each innovation (Japan vs. Korea) 
Triangular innovation in 
Forecast error in K •• S.E. del m dely delr 
del m 1 0.0160 1.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.0164 0.97 0.03 0.00 
6 0.0170 0.94 0.04 0.03 
9 0.0173 0.92 0.05 0.03 
12 0.0176 0.91 0.06 0.03 
36 0.0187 0.88 0.06 0.06 
dely 1 0.0068 0.10 0.90 0.00 
3 0.0072 0.13 0.83 0.04 
6 0.0077 0.19 0.74 0.07 
9 0.0084 0.22 0.68 0.10 
12 0.0091 0.24 0.65 0.10 
36 0.0098 0.24 0.65 0.11 
delr 1 0.0254 0.01 0.00 0.99 
3 0.0260 0.01 0.00 0.99 
6 0.0270 0.03 0.01 0.96 
9 0.0275 0.04 0.03 0.93 
12 0.0280 0.05 0.04 0.91 
36 0.0286 0.06 0.06 0.88 
This result implies that there is a stronger feedback of money into the 
income than that of the real exchange rate. 
The shock in the real exchange rate has accounted for the 
variability of itself very much (88%), which is consistent with the 
previous section—the real exchange rate movement is not caused by 
anything at a high signifiance level. 
Tables 5-5 and 5-6 display the forecast standard errors over various 
forecasting horizons, provided that the sampling error in the estimated 
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coefficients is ignored.Of course, in a dynamic econometric 
model, actual forecast errors will be substantially larger because the 
statisticaT'estimates are imperfect. 
We see that all the standard errors of the variables (U.S. vs. Korea 
and Japan vs. Korea) rise steadily as the forecasting horizon lengthens. 
The striking element is that the forecast standard error in the,real 
exchange rate (Japan vs. Korea) is larger than that of the U.S. vs. Korea 
system by almost two times. This may indicate that the real exchange 
movement for the Japan vs. Korea system is more nonstationary than that 
of the U.S. vs. Korea system. This result is consistent with the 
previous chapter; in the seemingly Unrelated Regression Model (with ARIMA 
model), the nonstationarity of the real exchange rate (U.S. vs. Korea) is 
not rejected. 
The Validity for Generating the Confidence Intervals 
for Impulse Responses and Variance Decompositions 
Runkle (1987) has questioned the statistical significance of 
variance decompositions and impulse response functions for unrestricted 
The standard errors are computed from the same MARS used in 
computing Tables 5 and 6. The tables use the formula for the 
t-step-ahead expected squared forecast error in variable i: 
- 2 , ,  P  Sr(i,t) = E Z a,.,. (v)^St 
i=l v=0 ^ 
2 2 
where there are p variables in the system, Sj = s (j,l) is the variance 
of the innovation, and a^j(v) is the coefficient on the v^^ lag of 
the innovation in the MAR equation for variable i (Sims, 1980a, b). 
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vector autoregressions. His argument is that reporting impulse response 
functions or variance decompositions is tantamount to using regression 
coefficients without t-statistics. Runkle showed that the standard 
statistics estimated by using unrestricted vector autoregressions 
(VARs)—impulse response functions and variance decompositions—are 
very imprecise estimates of their population counterparts. That is, 
the economic interpretation based on this kind of statistical result 
is very suspicious. 
To examine the importance of reporting confidence intervals for 
variance decompositions and impulse response functions, let's follow 
Runkle's simple example: 
Suppose that y^ has the univariate AR representation 
y^ = a y^_j + e^, where a <1 and e^ is white noise. 
Then we have a moving average representation, 
^t ~ (i-aL) ®t' where L is the lag operator. The response 
of y^^i^ to a shock in e^ is a^. By applying standard 
asymptotic theory, we know that if t^(a-a) is distributed 
as N(o,S^V"^), then t^(g(a) - g(a)) is distributed as 
N(o,S^GV"^G'), where is the variance of e^, V is the 
probability limit of y'y/t, and G=dg(a)/da. Hence, a 
standard-deviation confidence interval for the k^^ term 
in the impulse response function is 
f + 2k ak-l(s2(y'y)-l)%. 
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Note that the size of the confidence interval has grown dramatically 
relative to the size of the coefficient, whereas, the future impulse 
response (the current shock e^ multiplied by a^) goes to 0. This 
confidence interval says that the asymptotic t-statistic of the 
term in the impulse response function goes to 0 at the rate a/k. This 
univariate AR case can be extended to the vector cases which demonstrates 
the importance of generating the confidence interval for variance 
decompositions and impulse responses. 
Runkle (1987) has suggested two different methods to generate the 
confidence intervals for variance decompositions: by using a normal 
approximation to the distribution of the parameters of the variance 
decomposition and by using Efron's (1982) bootstrap method to generate 
the empirical confidence intervals.^ 
Block Causality Test 
In Section 1, we have employed the block causality test to select 
the model (the number of variables). A block causality test includes the 
concept that the lags of one set of variables do not enter into the 
equations for the remaining variables as its null hypothesis. Granger-
Sims causality tests are generalized in this text. 
In this section, we examine the block exogeneity of the variables 
in the system, By doing so, we may confirm the result in the previous 
section. 
^See Sims (1987), who has used a full Bayesian Monte Carlo method­
ology in forming the distribution theory, for more details. 
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Consider the U.S. vs. Korea system: The block exogeneity for both 
the real exchange rate and the relative productivity ratio is not passed 
at a 5% significance level. That is, the movements of both the relative 
productivity ratio and the real exchange rate are not independent of the 
relative monetary shock in the U.S. The implication is that money does 
matter in the movement of both. 
The block causality test is passed for the relative money supply 
ratio and the real exchange rate at a 5% significance level. The 
movements of both the relative money supply ratio and the real exchange 
rate are independent of the relative productivity shock in the U.S. This 
result is consistent with the previous result that money does matter in 
the movement of the real exchange in the presence of the lagged values of 
the real exchange rate and the relative productivity ratio. 
The block causality test was done for the relative money supply 
ratio and the relative productivity ratio. The movement of the real 
exchange rate is very important in explaining the movements of the 
relative money supply ratio and the relative productivity ratio at a 5% 
significance level. 
Consider the Japan vs. Korea system. The block causality test for 
the relative productivity ratio and the real exchange rate is not passed 
at a 5% significance level. The relative monetary shoe- in Japan is very 
important in the movement of the relative productivity ratio and the real 
exchange rate. 
The block exogeneity of the relative money supply and the real 
exchange rate has passed at a 5% significance level. This result implies 
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that both the movement of the real exchange rate and that of the relative 
money supply ratio is not affected by the relative productivity shock in 
Japan. 
Contrary to the U.S. vs. Korea system, the block exogeneity test of 
the relative money supply ratio and relative productivity ratio is 
passed. The real exchange movement is not important for the movement for 
the relative money supply ratio and the relative productivity ratio in 
Japan. 
Long-Run Neutrality of Money 
For the U.S. vs. Korea case, movements in the real exchange rate are 
not explained by productivity shocks at conventional significance levels 
(the marginal significance level is 0.69). In contrast, the marginal 
significance level for the relative money supply shocks is 9%; thus, 
there is some evidence that money supply shocks--but not productivity (or 
interest rate shocks)—affect the real exchange rate between the U.S. and 
Korea. 
The Korean vs. Japanese results are that movements in the money 
supply ratio and the real exchange rate appear to be completely 
autonomous; movements in these variables are not even explained by their 
own past. 
Note that the standard money neutrality proposition is that money 
should not cause changes in relative prices in the long-run. The 
question is that money really does matter in the nonstationarity of the 
U.S. vs. Korea real exchange rate movement. 
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To investigate the long-run neutrality of money for the bilateral 
real exchange rate movement (U.S. vs. Korea), we set up the hypothesis as 
follows: 
delr(t) = «Q + delm(t-l) + delm(t-2) + ... + delm(t-12) 
+ dely(t-l) + Bg dely(-2) + ... + dely(t-12) 
+ Yj delr(t-l) + ... + delr(t-12) 
Ho (null hypothesis) ; aJ + + ... + = 0 
Ha (alternative hypothesis); + «g + ••• + ^ 0 
F-statistic, F(l, 125) = .256, ind-cated that the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected at a high significance level (66%). This test 
result implies that money really does not matter for the movement of the 
U.S. vs. Korea real exchange rate in the long-run. This is consistent 
with the standard PPP theory: monetary shocks may induce temporary 
deviations from PPP, given the long-run neutrality of money, these 
deviations should eventually be eliminated. Real disturbances, on the 
other hand, can induce permanent chages in the real exchange rate. 
Conclusions 
To analyze the PPP disparity, the VAR system (3 variables and 12 
lags) has been employed. 
For the U.S. vs. Korea system, the relative monetary shock is 
important for the nonstationarity of the real exchange rate movement. 
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while we can not find any factor to explain the nonstationarity of the 
real exchange movement in the Japan vs. Korea system. This result is 
confirmed by the impulse response, the variance decomposition, and the 
block causality test in both systems. Finally, we have tested the long-
run neutrality of money for the bilateral real exchange rate movement 
(U.S. vs. Korea). Test results show that the relative monetary shocks 
do not cause the U.S. vs. Korea real exchange rate movement in the long-
run. This is consistent with the theory of PPP. 
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Figure 5-1. Responses of delm, dely, and delr to a shock in delm 
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Figure 5-2. Responses of delm, dely, and delr to a shock in dely 
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Figure 5-3. Responses of delm, dely, and delr to a shock in delr 
(U.S. vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-5. Responses of delg to a shock in delm (U.S. vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-6. Responses of delr to a shock in delm (U.S. vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-9. Responses of delr to a shock in dely (U.S. vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-10. Responses of delm to a shock in delr (U.S. vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-13. Responses of delm, dely, and delr to a shock in delm 
(Japan vs. Korea) 
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Figure 5-15. Responses of delm, dely, and delr to a shock in delr 
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Figure 5-22. Responses of delm to a shock in delr (Japan vs. Korea) 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Korea is representative of the growing economies with strong trading 
ties to other Pacific Rim nations—specifically to the United States and 
to Japan. So, the study of the PPP performance in the Korean economy was 
very impressive. 
The standard ARIMA models of the real exchange rate for Korea and her 
major trading partners were favorable to the long-run PPP. However, using 
unit root and cointegration tests, we found that there was little evidence 
supporting the PPP hypothesis for the Pacific Rim: 1) by using Dickey-
Fuller tests, v;e could not reject the null hypothesis of a single unit 
root for any nation except India, 2) SURE estimates indicated that both 
the U.S. and Indian real exchange rate were convergent, and 3) 
cointegration tests for all nations but Thailand failed to indicate PPP. 
The overall impression was that PPP can not be said to hold for the 
Korean economy. Furthermore, these results are consistent with those for 
the Western nations and Japan; there exist shocks to the real exchange 
rate that are not self-correcting. 
The theory suggests that permanent real economic shocks can induce 
permanent changes in the real exchange rate. Money supply shocks, 
however, are generally deemed to be neutral in the long run. Thus, the 
theory suggests that monetary shocks of any variety may induce temporary 
but not permanent changes in the real exchange rate. 
To ascertain the theory we employed the vector autoregressive (VAR) 
analysis. We also focused on the U.S. vs. Korea and the Japan vs. Korea 
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VAR systems. By using vector autoregressions, we found mixed support for 
the theory. Real shocks (as measured by interest rates or industrial 
production) did not appear to cause movements in the real exchange rates. 
For the U.S. vs. Korea system, money shocks did Granger-cause the real 
exchange rate at the 10% significance level. On the other hand, money 
shocks did not Granger-cause the real exchange rate at the 5% significance 
level for the Japan vs. Korea system. In support of the standard claim, 
money shocks did not cause permanent changes in the real exchange rate. 
For further research in this area, we may consider the other real 
shocks (for example, government spending) to support the theory of PPP. 
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